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According to the United Nation’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
Population Division, 66% of the world’s population will reside in urban areas by 
2050; a boost from 30 % in 1950. Urbanization has indeed triumphed and its speed 
has brought innovation and economic growth. Its synergies within infrastructure 
systems are undeniable and have increased the demand for such systems. However, 
urbanization is one reason infrastructure systems are knocked out of equilibrium and 
show complex dynamical behavior. Most infrastructure systems have been designed 
without planning for this magnitude of potential demographic changes; thus redesigns 
are long overdue. Also, climate change looms. Resource scarcity and host of other 
factors leave their impacts; all pose some incidence of perturbation in the state of the 
infrastructure system. These perturbations can affect the system’s resilience, which is 
a defining property of each system for remaining functional in the midst of disruption 
  
from adverse event. Therefore, it is essential to develop appropriate metrics and 
methods to enhance the resilience of infrastructures at the network level. Such 
enhancements are critical for sustainable infrastructure development that is capable of 
performing satisfactorily through intentional and/or stochastic disruptions. A 
resilience evaluation of a network typically entails assessing vulnerability and 
robustness as well as identifying strategies to increasing network efficiency and 
performance and offering recovery strategies ideally taken in a cost-effective manner. 
 
This dissertation uses complex network theory (CNT) as the theoretic basis to 
enhance the resilience of large-scale infrastructure networks, such as urban rail transit 
systems. Urban rail transit infrastructures are heterogeneous, complex systems 
consisting of a large number of interacting nodes and links, which can imitate a 
network paradigm. Any adverse event leading to a disruption in the interaction and 
connectivity of network components would dramatically affect the safety and 
wellbeing of commuters, as well as the direct and indirect costs associated with 
performance loss. Therefore, enhancing their resilience is necessary.  
 
Using the Washington D.C. Urban rail transit as a case study, this dissertation 
develops a methodology to analyze network topology, compute its efficiency, 
vulnerability and robustness in addition to provide a unified metric for assessing the 
network resilience. The steps of methodology are applied to two models of weighted 
and unweighted networks. For the weighted model two novel algorithms are proposed 
  
to capture the general pattern of ridership in the network, and to reflect the weights on 
assessing network efficiency, respectively. 
 
This dissertation then proposes an effective strategy to increase the network resilience 
prior to a disruptive event, e.g., a natural disaster, by adding several loop lines in the 
network for topological enhancement. As such, adding a loop line can create 
redundancy to the vulnerable components and improve network resilience. Expanding 
on this, the dissertation offers comparative recovery strategies and cost model in the 
case of disruption. An effective recovery strategy must demonstrate rapid optimal 
restoration of a disrupted system performance while minimizing recovery costs. 
 
In summary, the systematic methodology described above, assesses and enhances the 
network resilience. The initial results rank the most vulnerable and robust 
components of the network. The algorithms developed throughout the study advance 
the weighted network analysis state of art. The topological enhancement strategy 
offered basis to justify capital improvement. Post failure recovery analysis and the 
cost model serves to inform decision makers in identifying best recover strategies 
with special attention not only to restoring performance of a system but also on 
reducing associated failure and recovery costs. The use of the methodology proposed 
in this dissertation may lead to significant societal benefits by reducing the risk of 
catastrophic failures, providing references for mitigation of disruption due to adverse 
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A portion of this dissertation has been written during the pandemic due to COVID-
19 outbreak in 2020. At the beginning of the year, Jan. 8, 2020, some of my fellow 
Iranian Ph.D. students went to the airport, waved their hands to their families to take 
off by PS752 flight to pursue their dreams and they, along with other passengers, 
never saw the arrival time. These events along with many others spread sorrow. I, like 
many, grasped more than ever how, we, the people, are a connected network and we 
are impacted by a single moment of human suffering or bliss. This dissertation, which 
is all about the network, is dedicated to all those who have ever seen the people as an 
intertwined network and realized that the pain and pleasure of each one are related to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Resilient infrastructure networks are important assets of any urban area; they impact 
the environment and support the life and well-being of its inhabitants. This chapter 
provides an overview of definitions of infrastructure networks, resilience and its 
attributes as well as an introduction to networks, their form and characteristic, and 
network analysis methods. In addition, this chapter describes the knowledge gaps and 
objectives of this study. 
 
1.1 Infrastructure Systems 
1.1.1 Definition of infrastructure systems 
Infrastructures are the engine and backbone of urban life. They provide populations in 
urban areas with amenities and services. “Vast networks of energy, water, 
wastewater, transportation, landscapes, and communications are the fundamental 
means by which the society sustains life and well-being” (Pollalis et al. 2012). In its 
broadest sense, infrastructure consists of various systems and essential amenities and 
services that assist an organization or society to function. The Merriam-Webster 
dictionary (1828) defines the term “infrastructure” as the “underlying foundation or 
basic framework” enabling an organization or system to operate, as well as “the 






1.1.2 Types of Infrastructure systems based on their functions 
In agreement with the definition of infrastructure, any asset containing physical, 
economic, social, political, cyber and other dimensions that support the fundamental 
need of society could be considered as infrastructure systems (Pollalis et al. 2012). 
For instance, roadways, railways, airports, power grids, water pipelines, 
communication systems, backup generators, landscapes, hospitals, schools, 
workforce, etc., are subcategories of physical infrastructure systems. Supply chain, 
however, could even be categorized as economic and nonphysical infrastructure 
types. Figure 1.1 shows some examples of major physical infrastructure systems that 
are essential for the built environment.  
 







Infrastructure systems can also be categorized based on their criticality to the society, 
which this classification is based on governmental evaluation.  
 
• Critical Infrastructures 
According to Department of Homeland security (DHS, 2018), the term critical 
infrastructure refers to any infrastructure system that is considered vital to the society. 
DHS (2018) classifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors including chemical, 
commercial facilities, communications, critical manufacturing, dams, defense 
industrial base, emergency infrastructure, energy, financial services, food and 
agricultural, government facilities, healthcare and public health, information 
technology, nuclear reactors/materials/waste, transportation systems, and water and 
wastewater systems. 
 
•  Others 
Any infrastructure system that is not included in the critical infrastructure systems 
identified by Department of Homeland security (DHS, 2018) is not considered as 
critical infrastructures by governments.  
 
1.1.3 Infrastructure classification based on distribution mechanisms 
Infrastructure systems could be categorized as networks, nodal points, or the 
combination of those two in terms of their distribution mechanisms and their 





network, network components− which are basically several nodes connected by 
several links −and patterns of connections among nodes are responsible for 
distribution or collection purposes. For example, an urban water system could be 
considered as an infrastructure network in which water plants represent nodes and 
water pipelines indicate links. 
 
In nodal point infrastructure types, a key component of the infrastructure system 
is/are one or few points that distribute or collect the resources to/from a variety of 
locations. For example, ports and airports are good examples of nodal points 
infrastructures.  
 
Whether or not an infrastructure system is a network or a nodal point system, will be 
based on a project’s size, the target of a study, and planning characteristics (e.g., 
centralized or decentralized). For example, in analyzing the reliability of a power 
system for one facility, a power system is modeled as a nodal point infrastructure. 
However, modeling power plants and power grids in measuring the vulnerability of 
the power system in a city level requires modeling power systems based on network 
characterization. Figure 1.2 (a-b) displays a network configuration and nodal point 







Figure 1.2. (a) Network configuration, and (b) Nodal point representation of 
infrastructure systems. 
 
Many infrastructure systems are combinations of network and nodal point types. The 
one that is dominant determines the modeling method to fulfil the objective of the 
study. Understanding the distinction between the distribution mechanisms, i.e., 
network or nodal point types, could help in developing the resilience metric and 
measuring the vulnerability and robustness of a system.  
 
This dissertation will focus on assessing the resilience of infrastructure networks 
through transportation system infrastructure as a case study. Thus, sections 1.2 and 
1.3 and their subsections provide an in-depth overview introduction to networks in 
general as well as resilience definition and its attributes, i.e, performance, robustness 





1.2 Introduction to networks 
1.2.1 Definition of a network  
According to Cambridge dictionary (1995) “a network is a large system consisting of 
many similar parts that are connected together to allow movement or communication 
between or along the parts, or between the parts and a control center.”  
 
A network or a graph, in its simplest form, is a collection of points joined together in 
pairs by lines. Points are referred to as vertices or nodes and lines are termed links or 
edges (Newman 2010). In fact, a network is a powerful abstract representation of a 
particular simplified system that breaks the system into nodes and edges and the 
pattern of connections. The behavior of any given network is highly dependent in 
those patterns of connections and interactions.  
 
For instance, an urban rail transit system could be a tangible example of a network 
paradigm. Stations represent nodes and all other segments like tunnels, bridges, above 
grounds and etc., represent links. The performance of an urban rail transit system 
could depend on the connectivity pattern among the stations.  
 
Networks or graphs that are used interchangeably in this dissertation are also 







1.2.2 Types of networks  
• Directed and undirected networks 
A network could be directed or undirected. Directed graph or digraph includes a set 
of links that have directions associated with them displayed by arrows on the links to 
indicate the direction of those links. If the network does not have such characteristic, 
it is called an undirected graph.  
 
• Weighted and unweighted networks 
In an unweighted network, representation of a network is binary and links either exist 
or not without carrying any strength. In contrast, a weighted network is a type of 
graph in which a link carries some strengths and is given a numerical value.  
 
• Simple and non-simple networks 
A simple network or a strict graph contains neither multi-links nor self-links 
meaning there is not more than one link between any pair of nodes as well as nodes 
cannot be connected to themselves. Simple graphs are undirected and unweighted 
networks (Gibbons 1985;West et al. 2001; Newman 2011). Figure 1.3 shows a 
simple graph in which S1, S2…,S6 represent nodes and the lines that connect the 







Figure 1.3. An example of a simple graph. 
 
Non-simple networks are not simple and could include loops and/or multiple links 
between any pair of nodes.  
  
• Bipartite Networks 
A bipartite graph or bigraph is defined as a graph with the collection of its nodes 
partitioned into two or more disjointed subsets of nodes, such that the nodes in the 
same subset are not interconnected together, while a node in a subset is connected to 
one or more nodes in the other subset as shown in Fig. 1.4.  
 
 





Thus, defining network properties and utilizing methods and tools to determine the 
network patterns of connection are necessary.  
 
• Single layer and multi-layer networks 
The distinction between a single layer network and a multi-layer network is based on 
the number of layers that are connected together. A single layer network consists of 
a one-layer graph, whereas a multilayer network consists of multiple layers of 
single-layer networks (Boccalettiet al. 2014; Kivelä et al. 2014; Danziger et al. 
2014). Figure 1.5 (a-b) illustrates the single layer network and the multilayer 
network, respectively. Where the various layers of a multilayer network are intended 
to have a particular relationship, the nodes in the different graph layers could be 
connected by links to represent that relationship. Such a multilayer network is also 
called a “network of networks”. 
 
 





1.3 Network Analysis and Application Domains Overview  
Any system of interest that is composed of homogenous or/and heterogenous 
components linked together exemplifies a network. Thus, a broad range of network 
applications exists (e.g., ecosystem, human societies, spread of epidemics, collection 
of computers linked by data, internet and infrastructure networks to name a few). 
Many aspects of these networks could be better understood by studying the structure 
of such networks.  
 
To study the structure of a network and how its components work together, there are 
extensive integrated techniques, mathematical tools, and computational programs 
available that might well be useful. Network analysis (NA) is using these tools and 
techniques to depict the relationship and pattern of connection among network 
components.  
1.3.1 Methods of network analysis 
• Complex Network Theory 
Complex network theory (CNT) is a basic method that has been widely used in 
modeling urban critical infrastructure networks, such as power grids, water 
distribution systems, transportation networks, etc. Complex network theory is 
modeling a real system of interest in a form of graph with non-trivial topological 
elements that traditional networks do not possess (Lu et al. 2013; Chen et al.2012; 
Thai & Pardalos, 2012; Nielsen, 2011; Easley & Kleinberg 2010, Newman, 2010). 





characteristic indicators assist to calculate desired network attributes. CNT has been 
widely used in critical urban infrastructure networks, including grid networks (Albert 
et al. 2004; Wang and Rong 2009; Winkler et al. 2010, Ezzeldin and El-Dakhakhni, 
2019), pipeline networks (Ouyang et al. 2008; Carvalho et al. 2009), water 
distribution networks (Simone et al. 2018), transport networks (e.g., roadway (Wu et 
al. 2007)), and airway networks (Zhang et al. 2010)). 
 
• Bayesian Network 
Bayesian networks (BN) are probabilistic graphical models for representing 
multivariate probability distributions and are used to capture the unknown and 
uncertainty disguised in the network. In BN models, nodes representing random 
variables and directed links describing probabilistic dependencies (Bensi et al. 2011).  
The method is explicitly underlined on vast conditional dependencies of network 
components. BN includes principles from different theories: graph theory, probability 
theory, computer science, and statistics (Gopnik &Tenenbaum, 2007). BNs can be 
used for assessing a wide range of attributes that are of paramount to infrastructure 
networks. For instance, Johansen and Tien (2017) employed BN to model the 
interdependencies among various infrastructure systems such as water, gas, and 
power systems. Hosseini & Barker (2016) used BN to model waterway ports. Tien & 
Kiureghian (2016) developed an algorithm for BN modeling and reliability of 
infrastructure systems and Bensi et al. (2009) assessed the performance of spatially 






• Simulation Based Analysis  
Simulation based analyses are techniques whereby specific software programs or a 
number of algorithms imitate the behavior of a network and models the interactions 
of its components. Simulation is an approach to forecast or measure the performance 
of large, complex and stochastic systems (Flood, 1998). A simulation-based analysis 
could be used as a single approach of analysis or it could be integrated with other 
approaches to capture a holistic view of it. There are typically two types of simulation 
approaches used to model networks, i.e., discrete event simulation (DES) and 
continuous simulation (CE). DES models the operation of a stochastic network as a 
sequence of discrete events and sets of variables. CE also models sets of events and 
variables, however, the changes in the variables take place continuously. Simulation 
methods take random process and probabilistic analysis into account and empower 
users to study the interactions and component relationships of a network in details 
before implementing it in the real world (Flood 1998).  
 
Simulation-based methods have been widely used in network analysis. Tako and 
Robinson (2012) used discrete event simulation as decision support system in supply 
chain (SC) networks. Schmitt &Singh (2012) developed a simulation model to 
capture an actual network for consumer-packaged goods that a company is used for 
the analysis. Parker and Epstein (2014) applied agent-based modeling simulation to 
model the spread of an epidemic disease outbreak in a social network consisting 





evacuation in a metro due to fire. Abdalla et al. (2007) simulated the performance of 
the water network using the data collected after flooding.  
 
• Others 
Several other methods could be used to analyze a network based on the target and the 
objective of the study. The methods outlined above also could be integrated and used 
in analyzing a network. 
1.3.2 Complex network theory selection for analyzing urban infrastructure networks 
Since this dissertation widely focuses on network topological analysis, it primarily 
uses the CNT method of modeling infrastructure networks. Therefore, elaborating the 
method, and its advantages and disadvantages, seems necessary.  
 
Typically, two models are used under the CNT method; the model that is able to 
capture the network flow of the network; and the model that only focuses on the 
network topology. In other words, the CNT method could be employed to model the 
infrastructure network as a weighted network or an unweighted one. Both models are 
acceptable and have been widely used in relevant literature.  
 
The focus of the weighted model is on both the network flow and the network 
topology, while the unweighted network merely focuses on the network topology. A 
weighted network could reflect more dimensions of the network of interest, and so it 
can be particularly helpful in transportation networks where not only the topology is 





CNT method could simplify a highly complex system to the network consisting nodes 
and links. It works well in modeling the structural features of infrastructure networks 
and their pattern of connectivity and it provides an acceptable approximation  for 
considering the flow of the network. It does not pose a heavily computational burden 
in the analytical process. However, some limitations exist in the use of complex 
network theory. For example, each network comes from or is based on a specific 
domain with particular characteristics. Analyses results from the CNT method need to 
be verified using domain specific models. In addition, while CNT could provide an 
acceptable approximation for considering the flow of the network, it fails to consider 
the actual distribution with associated dynamics of the flow. Furthermore, the 
weighted model typically works well for single-layer networks and yet cannot easily 
model multi-layers networks.  
 
The CNT method also fails to detect or consider any structural defects as a source of 
hazards in the network prior to any failure. CNT could be integrated with other 
methods used in the field of network analysis to capture actual dynamics associated 











Table 1.1 Advantages and disadvantages of complex network theory (CNT) 
Complex Network Theory 
Advantages Disadvantages 
It is a powerful tool in modeling the 
structure features of infrastructure 
networks and their pattern of 
connectivity. 
 
It is sensitive to the domain specific 
models.  
Does not require a high computational 
work. 
 
It fails to capture the actual dynamic of 
the network. 
It could simplify a highly complex 
system to the network consisting nodes 
and links. 
 
The weighted model cannot be easily 
used for multi-layer networks.   
 
Provides an acceptable approximation  
for considering the flow of the network 
CNT method also fails to detect or 
consider any structural defects as a 
source of hazards in the network prior to 
any failure. 
 
This dissertation as previously stated, aims to model the critical infrastructure system 





network resilience and its attributes. The next section, defines resilience and its 
attributes and describe what the infrastructure network resilience is? 
1.4 Resilience of Infrastructure Networks 
1.4.1 Definition of resilience 
The term resilience appears in different fields and disciplines ranging from ecology, 
biology, physics, physiology, sociology, engineering to networks and infrastructure 
networks (Ayyub 2014b; Ayyub 2015; Hosseini et al 2016). It has been defined based 
on its application and use in some certain domains.  
 
• In ecology, resilience is the ability of a system to absorb changes in 
variables and parameters and still persists (Holling 1973; Ayyub 2014b). 
• Gao et al. (2016) defined resilience as a fundamental property of each 
complex system such as a biological system and its ability to remain 
functional when errors, failures and environmental changes occur. 
• In physics, “resilience is the ability of an elastic material (such as rubber 
or animal tissue) to absorb energy (such as from a blow) and release that 
energy as it springs back to its original shape” (Merriam-Webster 
dictionary 1828). 
• In physiology, resilience is an individual tendency to mentally or 
emotionally cope with disturbance and crisis and return to pre-crisis state 





• In sociology, resilience is the tendency of groups or communities to cope 
with stress and adversity caused by social, political or environmental 
changes (Adger 2000). 
• According to a Presidential Policy Directive (PPD 21) (Presidential Policy 
Directive (PPD) 2013) on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 
“the term resilience means the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing 
conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience 
includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, 
accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.” Ayyub (2015) 
further proposed the definition for the resilience of a system as “the 
persistence of its functions and performances under uncertainty in the face 
of disturbances.” This definition can be used in a variety of areas. 
 
Additionally, resilience could be defined as the state that is expected as the recovery 
process emerges. Resilience addresses all activities through recovery such as 
prevention, protection from, mitigation, respond to and recovery from a threat or 
hazard that pose a great risk to a system (FEMA 2011).  
1.4.2 Definition of resilience attributes 
In many cases, evaluating the resilience of a system require measuring system 
performance, efficiency, robustness, vulnerability and some other attributes. Thus, the 






• Performance: According to Cambridge dictionary (1995) performance is 
the overall quality of a piece of work or activity that a person, machine, 
etc. is able to perform. In the context of network analysis, performance is 
the network’s ability to provide services by proper work of all its 
components together. For instance, in a power grid network, performance 
is the quality of transmitting power to different parts of the network by 
proper cooperation of all power network components such as power 
stations, transmission towers, power grids, distribution systems, electrical 
circuits, etc.  
• Efficiency: The background and etymology of the word efficiency springs 
back to the Latin word “efficientia” meaning to produce or increase some 
aspects of a system immediately (Merriam-Webster dictionary 1828). 
Hence, efficiency is the measure of the degree that a system is able to 
produce. In discussing a basis of network analysis, its definition as 
proposed by Latora & Marchiori (2001) is a measure of the flow 
efficiency between two nodes and it highly depends on the connectivity of 
those two nodes together. The concept of network efficiency can be used 
to both local and global scales. In fact, the global efficiency is an indicator 
of the node connectivity of a whole network. 
• Robustness: The quality of being strong enough to not to fail in any 
adverse event is robustness. It is the ability of system components to 
sustain external shocks without significant degradation of performance 





network, robustness refers to the ability of a network to withstand residual 
node connectivity after a disruptive event. 
• Vulnerability: Contrary to robustness, vulnerability is the capability of 
being wounded, either physically or emotionally. First known use of 
vulnerability in English literature is back to early 1600. It is ultimately 
derived from the Latin word “vulnus” and “vulnerar” that originally mean 
“wound” and “to wound”, respectively (Merriam-Webster dictionary, 
1828). Paul (2014) defined the vulnerability in a system as an internal risk 
factor of system components that are exposed to external shocks. 
Vulnerability is the degree of susceptibility of a system to disruptive 
events; a higher vulnerability is associated with a greater susceptibility for 
adverse effects. In the context of network analysis, vulnerability relates to 
the negative changes in the global connectivity of a network after 
perturbations. 
 
1.4.3 Definition of infrastructure network resilience  
Infrastructure networks can be complex, and it is sometimes difficult to predict their 
resilience to changing conditions. Typically, a network with a significant number of 
connections can more easily adapt to changes. If a single component fails, the 
network can compensate to some degree. However, as more components fail, the 
network grows weaker and the number of remaining functioning components 





the network can no longer compensate for further changes and its functionality 
disappears. This point represents the network resilience (Nature video 2016). 
 
In the case of civil infrastructure networks, resilience is associated with the ability of 
the infrastructure network to deliver a certain level of service even after extreme 
events occur (Bocchini et al. 2013). In other words, the infrastructure network 
continues to deliver services up to the point that is considered the infrastructure 
network resilience. After reaching that point, the infrastructure network loses its 
serviceability. 
 
1.4.4 Resilience assessment and sustainable development 
Brundtland (1987) defined the sustainable development as the development that 
meets the need of the present generation and the impacts on the future generation. 
This definition is in agreement with the sustainability definition itself which is 
preserving the environment, natural resources, the health of the residents and other 
basic requirements for the present and future generations to use.  
 
Bocchini et al. (2013) described resilience and sustainability concepts consist of large 
similarities and as two paramount complementary attributes of any system which they 
should be taken into consideration in an integrated perspective. In a sense, resilience 
assessment is part of a sustainable development. Bocchini et al. (2013) further 
clarified the difference between sustainability and resilience is related to the 





consequences of an extreme event with small probability of occurrence, while 
sustainability focuses on certain consequences distributed over the lifecycle of a 
system. Obtaining the sustainable state of a system, therefore, requires a system to be 
resilient. 
 
According to Nelson et al. (2019) the concepts of vulnerability, resilience, 
sustainability that are frequently used to frame assessments related to system quality 
are interrelated; disregarding each of these concepts in the assessment could result in 
negative and unintended consequences.  
 
Now the main question that arise is, how can we further develop resilient and 
sustainable infrastructure networks? 
 
1.5 Knowledge gaps, research questions and objectives 
The U.N.’s Human Settlements Program predicts a near doubling of the world’s 
population living in urbanized areas by 2050 (Lederer 2013). Such foresight has 
increased the demand for infrastructure systems. Widespread use of the CIs subjects 
them to a diverse range of disturbances. A synergistic rapid growth of urban 
population concurrent with great increases in infrastructure systems’ use may lead to 
perturbations in the state of such systems. Epidemic/pandemic diseases, natural 
disasters, climate change, extreme events, resource scarcity, human interventions, 
foreseeable future changes and other factors may pose some incidence of disturbance 





cascading failure events in the state of infrastructure systems, in particular, the 
network type infrastructures, could extend throughout regional or/and national level. 
For example, the global COVID-19 outbreak in 2019-20 has impacted infrastructure 
networks and caused significant economic and social disruptions (World economic 
forum 2020). As another example, Hurricane Maria −which until 2019 was the 
deadliest natural disaster in the United States for about hundred years− led to one of 
the largest infrastructure failure events in Puerto Rico (Center for Puerto Rico 2018). 
Climate change impacts such as heat wave often leads to asphalt melting and concrete 
hogging, in roadways and also provides disturbance in rail infrastructure systems 
(McEvoy et al. 2012). Worldwide extreme events such as 2001 World Trade Center 
Attack which caused damage to numerous buildings and full collapse of the twin 
towers (Mendonca & William 2006), or the 2007 UK floods that struck most parts of 
the country for approximately two months (Bloomfield et al. 2009). Major black out 
that commonly affects millions of Americans every four month is the example of 
resource scarcity (Ouyang 2014). Water shut-off due to infrastructure aging such as 
water pipes crumbling in the Great Lakes cities led to a serious crisis for residents 
(APM Reports 2019). All these failure events caused a huge number of mortalities, 
spread the sorrow, and cost billions of direct and indirect losses.  
 
Such disturbances can affect the system resilience to the extent that it would no 






Critical infrastructures are the backbone of the society and the economy and their 
resilience is an essential and vital property of CIs. Resilience enhancement and 
protection of CIs have been a growing concern in the recent years and considered as 
national priorities. For instance, the Executive Order (EO)13636 and Presidential 
Policy Directive (PPD) on protecting critical infrastructures are the remarks on the 
increasing need to enhance their resilience and to identify the successful practice and 
strategies to do so.  
 
Prior works have advanced the state-of- the-art solutions to this need, which have 
identified the different failure scenarios and have considerably enhanced the 
resilience of infrastructure systems and mitigated the risk. Many studies that are of 
conceptual and recommendation type, rather than modeling and simulation 
approaches typically belong to governmental reports. For example, Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) categorized critical infrastructures sectors and provided 
protective plans for them. President′s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection (PCCIP) recommended some policies, research program establishments 
and technology developments to protect CIs. Specific other governmental reports also 
provided some infrastructure recovery plans for infrastructure systems following a 
failure event (FEMA 2018). However, governmental reports have not offered any 
technical approaches or discussed modeling to protect CIs, assess their resilience and 
mitigate their risk. The technical parts have been addressed by many scholars in this 





(O’Rourke et al. 2002; Ostfled 2005; Nelson at al. 2007; O’Rourke et al. 2007; 
Santora and Wilson 2008, Nazif et al. 2009; Omer et al. 2009).  
 
Many studies used historical failure or empirical data to detect the CIs area of 
vulnerability and assess the system resilience (Utne et al. 2011; Kjølle et al. 2012; 
Ezell et al. 2000a; Ezell et al. 2000b; Alger et al. 2004; Abdalla et al. 2007; 
McDaniels et al. 2007; McDaniels et al. 2008; Singha and Kalita 2013; Wang and 
Taylor 2015; Duan et al. 2017; Hasnat et al. 2018). A large number of studies used 
probabilistic analysis in infrastructure systems to measure the risk and/or to develop 
the resilience index (Henley and Kumamoto 1996; Ayyub et al. 2009a; Ayyub et al. 
2009b; Ayyub 2014a; Modarres et al. 2016; Eldosouky et al. 2017). Simulation-based 
analysis also have been widely used in modeling infrastructure systems and 
measuring the resilience of such systems (Abdalla et al. 2007; Barrett et al. 2010; 
Chen et al. 2015; Chen et al. 2017).  
 
As previously stated network modeling such as Bayesian method (Bensi et al. 2009; 
Bensi et al. 2011; Gopnik and Tenenbaum, 2007; Hosseini and Barker 2016; Tien and 
Kiureghian 2016; Johansen and Tien 2017) and complex network theory (Albert et 
al., 2004; Wu et al. 2007; Ouyang et al. 2008; Carvalho et al., 2009; Wang and Rong 
2009; Winkler et al. 2010; Zhang et al. 2010; Simone et al 2018; Ezzeldin and El-
Dakhakhni 2019) have been largely used to assess the resilience and reliability of 






The method of Infrastructure modeling and resilience assessments are not limited to 
aforementioned methods outlined above; however, the focus of this dissertation is on 
network-based methods and still there are gaps and challenges in existing work; 
therefor, future enhancement is necessary.  
 
• Gaps in Exiting Works 
The gaps exist in different steps of network analysis. For example, most of the 
network-based methods rely on network topology analysis; yet there are some 
topological characteristics (i.e., small world phenomenon that is related to 
connectivity of the network components) that are not fully explored and understood. 
This dissertation advanced the topological analysis method to better understand such 
characteristics.  
 
Many literatures measured the area of vulnerability and robustness of the network 
when it is subjected to node failures (Zhang et al. 2017; Piacenza et al. 2017; Scherb 
et al. 2017; Coar et al. 2019) while network links are also important network 
components and their failure could pose different responses/challenges in the 
network. The link failure in addition to node failure is investigated in this dissertation 
and the vulnerability and robustness of the networks are assed under those two 
different failure scenarios. 
 
The network representation could be binary, meaning that the network components 





precise model occurs when the network links carry some weight; there are some 
methods proposed to analyze a weighted network (Newman 2010; Guidotti et al. 
2017) , however, some of the algorithms contain heavy computationally work and/or 
are still insufficient to capture the variant weights, i.e., negative weights, in the 
network. This dissertation proposes the novel algorithm that is more inclusive and 
also has less computational burden.  
 
In the end, strategies that have been offered to enhance the resilience of the 
infrastructure network typically refer to the post-failure state of the network (Henry 
and Ramiz-Marquez 2012; Zhang et al. 2017; FEMA 2018), whereas strategies prior 
to failure mostly provide recommendations for protection (DHS, PCCIP). It is critical 
to technically apply some hypothetical strategy scenarios to the network to investigate 
its response to failure events. This dissertation investigates some strategies to enhance 
resilience of the network prior to failure as well as improves the current recovery 
strategies.  
 
Measuring the resilience loss during or/and following an adverse event, provides a 
better understanding of sustainable development. Sustainable development goes 
toward forming the next generation of infrastructure systems, which trading friendly 
with the environment.  
 





One could perceive the earth as a giant and intricate complex infrastructure network 
with connected components. There has been much effort done to develop methods to 
increase the sustainability and the resilience of the components of this network in 
many ways.  
 
In this dissertation, I aim to apply a similar view to infrastructure projects and 
describe each relevant infrastructure system as a complex network, using the urban 
rail transit network as a case study.  
 
Sustainable infrastructure systems are resilient systems. Measurement methods and 
performance evaluation are key factors in designing and operating such complex 
systems. Methods of resilience measurement need to employ various fields of science 
and engineering and cannot be obtained through one discipline alone. A sense of 
interdisciplinary work should be applied to the challenge of infrastructure projects 
and their roles in the society which they function.  
 
To this end, given the importance of resilient and sustainable infrastructure 
development as well as the gaps discussed in the existing works, this dissertation uses 
knowledge from engineering, probability and statistics, economic, computer science, 
and network analysis to address, the four following categories of questions that may 







Which events/components are shaping the infrastructures networks and which events 
are shaped by them? How can we enhance the topological analysis of these networks 
as a fundamental step? And what would be a set of metrics we can develop to 
preserve the resilience of infrastructure networks? 
 
Category II 
How do these networks react in the event of failure? Does network response vary for 
various failure scenarios? 
 
Category III 
What is the dynamic/flow of the network and how the network dynamic/flow impact 
the network resilience ? 
 
Category IV 
Are there any precautious strategies we can employ to enhance the resilience of 
infrastructure networks? If the functionality of the system is disturbed, are there any 
strategies to help restore the system? Are these strategies cost-effective? 
 
• Research objectives 
It is through these enthusiastic questions that this dissertation begins to set the 







The size and complexity of networks and an analysis of its topology are responsible 
for the capacity of precisely determined metrics associated with the resilience of 
networks. Thus, the first step is defining an infrastructure system of choice in a 
network-based framework and analyzing its topology and assessing network 
efficiency which are the basis of developing the network resilience. Success 
determines which networks form and all the components that shape those networks. 
 
Objective II 
The different failure scenarios could make changes in the network vulnerability and 
robustness. For example, failing of different components of a network, i.e., node, link, 
may lead to a different response in the whole state of the network. Thus, the failure 
analysis is necessary to explore these changes. The failure analysis leads to assessing 
vulnerability of the network and developing resilience metric.  
 
Objective III 
Network resilience depends not only on the network’s topology, but also on the 
weights that the network components carry. There are obvious inadequacies in 
considering only a network topology, where the whole state of the network is 
assumed to depend on a single parameter. The more useful and precise resilience 
function is a multi-dimensional manifold over the complex parameter space 
characterizing the network. Any perturbation applied to the network could change the 
connectivity of the network topology as well as disrupt the network flow. Therefore, 





to reflect the network flow as well. Several factors, such as physical distances, in the 
networks or dynamical variations could be considered as network flow. The further a 
factor is seen; the better an assessment is made.  
 
Objective IV 
Increasing the resilience of the network by enhancing its topology prior to any failure,  
is one of the objectives of this dissertation. In addition, identifying proper post-failure 
recovery strategies, with special attention not only to restoring connectedness but also 
to minimize the total cost associated with a disruptive event resulting in resilience 
loss, is extensively elucidated. 
 
Objective V  
In the final step people will become part of the network directly and indirectly and 
their interaction with infrastructure networks will be considered. They increase scale 
and complexity of the network and the method in the objective II integrating with 
other methods, will be explored to find more precise resilience assessment. 
 
1.6 Proposed Work 
Since one of the most tangible examples of a complex infrastructure network is large 
scaled urban rail transit networks, the theoretical work of this dissertation to fulfill 
objectives outlined above, has been applied to urban rail transit networks. As such, 





study. In the rest of the dissertation, urban rail transit, metrorail and metro are used 
interchangeably. 
The serviceability of an urban rail transit network categorized as a critical 
infrastructure has a significant impact on resolving cities’ public transportation issues. 
It is an attractive, suitable and timely network, which has synergies with urbanization 
resulting in economic growth. It can redirect cities from poverty to prosperity.  
 
To sustain the serviceability of such infrastructure systems, this dissertation examines 
the metrorail network resilience and associated metrics with well-defined 
relationships to vulnerability and tied to efficiency. This examination includes 
developing a metro rail model in a graph form and obtaining its basic features by 
network topology analysis. As such, Washington D.C. Metro is presented as a 
network paradigm by defining all its network components. Its topological 
characteristics are identified, calculated and used as a basis for further analyses. Two 
models of unweighted and weighted networks are used to measure the vulnerability 
and robustness of the network for each model in any failure event. These models are 
compared to evaluate accuracy of each model. The resilience index is developed to 
assess the network resilience and some strategies are offered to enhance the resilience 
of the network prior to and following failure due to any disruptive event, i.e., natural 
disasters. These strategies include topology enhancement and recovery strategies 
identification with respect to minimizing the performance loss and total recovery cost. 
In the end methods are proposed to evaluate how human interaction can be part of the 






The proposed methodology of this dissertation is able to effectively predict the 
resilience loss in a metro network and measure its robustness, which is associated 
with passengers’ safety.  
 
Nonetheless, this dissertation is proposing the improved resilience assessment applied 
for rail transit networks, can be used for any other infrastructure network, and even 
not just infrastructure; it has great potential to be generalized for any network to 
increase its safety and sustainability.  
 
1.7 Organization of the dissertation 
Chapter 1 provides the definitions of infrastructure, network, resilience and its 
attribute, i.e., performance, efficiency, vulnerability, and robustness. Also describes 
the impact of resilience loss on the infrastructure, environment and society. A 
literature review is included to introduce the methods and models employed by 
network studies. Knowledge gaps, objectives, and research questions addressed in 
this dissertation are elaborated. 
 
Chapter 2 is a brief chapter that demonstrates the overall methodology of the 
dissertation. Demonstrating the overall methodology allows to articulate the 






Chapter 3 describes the network topology analysis that was part of a work published 
in the ASME-ASCE journal part B, in 2019. In graph theory, particularly using 
complex network theory method, network topology analysis is the basis of any further 
analysis and it is worthy to allocate a full chapter for that. The topology of a network 
has a huge influence on the insights that can be derived from a network and all the 
network characteristics depend on the network topology. In this chapter the 
Washington D.C. Metrorail is presented as a topological graph and the network 
components are defined. This chapter then calculates the topological network 
characteristic indicators that are important for the rest of this dissertation. 
 
Chapter 4 describes the study that was published in the ASME-ASCE journal part B, 
in 2019. It calculates metro network efficiency and evaluates the network 
vulnerability under some failure scenarios due to disruption in the network. 
Evaluation of the efficiency and vulnerability of a metrorail network following 
disruption requires consideration of two primary failure events, i.e., the failure of a 
metro station or the failure of a metro segment between stations. The nature of this 
disruption is not important in this chapter and the full failure of network components 
is considered one at a time. The vulnerability analysis is the basis for resilience 
assessment. Therefore, the resilience metric is developed and described. The 
examination and assessment in this chapter build on developing a metrorail model in 
a graph form and obtaining its basic features by network topology analysis that is 





merely the topology of the network and when the network is modeled as an 
unweighted one. 
 
Chapter 5 presents the study assessing the robustness and vulnerability of a weighted 
metro network, in which the ridership of the metro network is considered as an 
important factor through the calculations in addition to the network topological 
characteristics. This study has been submitted to Sustainable and Resilient 
Infrastructure Journal and currently is in the second round of review. Since ridership 
is a primary factor in defining the metrorail network performance, this chapter 
proposes a general ridership pattern and uses a novel methodology with developing a 
new algorithm to quantitatively measure the weighted-network robustness and 
vulnerability, which incorporates ridership throughout the Washington D.C. Metro as 
a case study. Therefore, such evaluations are no longer based on binary representation 
of the network. The weights that are carried by network components play an 
important role here. 
 
Chapter 6 offers strategies to increase the resilience of the metro network that were 
published in ASCE-ASME journal part A, in 2020. Part of the work presented in this 
chapter was also presented in International Mechanical Engineering Congress and 
Expositions (IMECE 2018). In this chapter, the results obtained through previous 
chapters are taken one step further to demonstrate the methodology for resilient-based 
topology enhancement and a post-failure recovery strategies provision. In a sense, the 





adding an interloop (loop line) to the network. Thus, several loop lines are examined 
to project the different scenarios to enhance the network topology. When a network 
topology enhances, so does the network resilience. In addition, an approach to 
identify proper post-failure recovery strategies with special attention not only to 
restoring connectedness, but also on minimizing the total cost associated with a 
disruptive event resulting in resilience loss is extensively elucidated. Moreover, this 
chapter proposes future work that can be done to enhance the resilience of rail transit 
networks in a timely manner. 
 
Chapter 7 outlines the conclusion, synthesis findings, major contributions and the 







Chapter 2: Overall Methodology  
2.1 Introduction 
This brief chapter proposes a systematic overall research methodology to achieve 
objectives outlined in Chapter 1. Developing a research methodology is a critical task 
which allows to understand underlying steps and actions required to fulfil the 
objectives−	as well as the study of boundaries and limitations−in a complete and 
comprehensive manner. The overall methodology is subsequently broken down in the 
following chapters to provide a detailed process of the set of interrelated 
methods/models used to accomplish each chapter objective using Washington D.C. 
Urban rail transit network as a case study.  
 
2.2 Overall Methodology for Resilience Enhancement of Infrastructure Networks 
2.2.1 Framework to assess the resilience attribute and develop resilience index 
The framework to assess the network resilience and its attributes selects CNT method 
as a main method of use. This framework that is applied on two models of weighted 
and unweighted networks is summarized in Fig. 2.1 and includes following steps:  
 
1. Defining a system as a network by specifying the network components and pattern 






2. Analyzing network topology that is the primary step for any further assessment; 
and results in computing network characteristic indicators and network efficiency; 
3. Assessing network efficiency for an unweighted network; 
4. Creating a weighted network by assigning weights to the network links. In this 
step, specifically for a metro network, a new algorithm is developed to model the 
general ridership pattern in the network and assign the ridership as weights on 
network links accordingly; 
5. Assessing network efficiency for a weighted network. The efficiency assessment 
for an unweighted network indicated in step 3 merely depends on the network 
topological characteristics. Whereas efficiency assessment for a weighted model in 
step 5 requires reflecting of weights carried by network components in addition to 
network topological characteristics. A novel algorithm is developed in this step to 
quantitatively reflect link weights on network efficiency formulation ; 
6. Assessing network vulnerability and robustness which are based on negative 
changes in efficiency as a result of a failure event, and residual network efficiency 
remaining following a failure in the network, respectively; and  









*Figure 2.2 is covered in detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
Figure 2.1. A framework for resilience assessment of an infrastructure network 
through metro network as a case study. 
 
2.2.2 Framework to identify strategies to enhance the resilience of the network   
The framework in this section offers strategies to enhance the resilience of a 
network according to the following two scenarios: 
• Identifying strategies to enhance resilience prior to failure; and 
• Identifying post failure strategies to enhance resilience. 
The resilience of a network prior to failure could be improved by enhancing 





create redundancy for critical network components and consequently decrease the 
network vulnerability and increase the network efficiency. The position of these 
loop lines has a considerable impact on the network efficiency. The goal is to 
protect most critical components of the network. If inserting a loop line in the 
network is cost effective, this topological enhancement is a promising strategy. 
 
The resilience enhancement following a failure, however, requires identifying a 
series of effective strategies with respect to minimizing performance loss and 
recovery cost, along with other considerations, i.e. practicality. To minimize the 
performance loss an effective method used to ranks the recovery sequences based 
on resilience restoration. To minimize the recovery cost, a comprehensive cost 
model is proposed through an example of a failure event within a metro network. 
 
Determining resilience enhancement strategies for both scenarios outlined above, 
requires vulnerability and robustness magnitudes as prerequisite terms and unified 
resilience index as a fundamental element. The framework to identify resilience 
enhancement strategies prior to and following failure is systematically followed by 
the framework to assess the network resilience demonstrated in the previous section 









*Figure 2.2 is covered in detail in Chapter 6. 
Figure 2.2. Identifying strategies to enhance the resilience of the network prior to and 
following failure. 
 
2.2.3 Human interaction with infrastructure and its impacts on network resilience 
Human interactions with infrastructure networks add another dimension in assessing 
network resilience. Thus, it is necessary to reflect this interaction in the resilience 





impact on network resilience is under development and will be studied and added to 
this chapter in the coming months. Detailed research questions and research 
objectives of this section are listed in Chapter7. 
 
2.3 Implication of the Methodology Results 
The overall methodology of this dissertation assesses and potentially improves the 
resilience of urban infrastructures that have a network-based paradigm, such as urban 
rail transits. The results of the study can lead to the best use of infrastructure networks 
by providing guidance to protect network vulnerable areas or by offering strategies to 
enhance the network resilience. The methodology also accounts for human interaction 
with the network in the resilience metric. While the methodology is examined 
specifically in the context of large scaled urban rail transits, however, is applicable 







Chapter 3: Topological Analysis of Metrorail Transit 
Networks, Washington D.C. Metro as a Case Study * 
3.1 Introduction 
Topology of a network refers to the properties of a network geometry and network 
structure. It demonstrates not only the network form and components, but rather the 
way that the components are connected together. In other words, a network topology 
describes the arrangement of network components (Grant 2014) and connectivity 
properties. In order to analyze the network topology, acquaintance with networks and 
their fundamental features is necessary. The structure of a network has an impact on 
how efficient the system is in meeting its functions. Studying the networks structure 
helps addressing many aspects of their functional purposes, such as estimating 
maximum flow, assessing routes of interest, exploring shortest paths, identifying the 
presence of hubs (i.e., nodes with high node degree), examining the impacts of 
attacks on or disruptions to the network. Also, such studies contribute to defining and 
quantifying associated costs, consequences of node or link failures, robustness, 
efficiency and resilience. 
 
                                               
* Paper published or submitted 
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Since this chapter exemplifies metro networks in general and Washington D.C. Metro 
network, in particular, the chapter initiates by stating the reasoning of why a metro 
system can be defined as a network and describes the advantage of defining a 
metrorail system in the framework of a network; then followed by introducing the 
Washington D.C. Metro network including data and information collected for the 
purposes of a case study. Introducing the case study at an early stage helps to 
illustrate the steps of topology analysis in this chapter and to demonstrate the 
methodology of the following chapters. This chapter terminates by network 
topological analysis applied to the Washington D.C. Metro. 
  
3.2 Defining Metrorail Systems as Networks 
The function of metrorail systems is meeting the transportation needs in cities by 
raising the capacity of public transportation, transferring people from one station to 
another in different parts of the cities. A metrorail system shares the general features 
of a network structure. It consists of stations (called nodes), links and patterns of 
interaction among nodes. Nodes and links are the essential elements to define a 
system in a network form. The connectivity properties are fundamental in 
understanding the network characteristics.  
 
Since a metrorail system consists of a large number of interacting nodes and links, it 
could be perceived as a network. Studying a metro network’s structure provides a 





network form in order to understand its topology and to assess its efficiency, 
vulnerability and robustness, and quantify its resilience. Results from the proposed 
methodology, therefore, could boost public transportation leading to an increase in 
utilization and improvement in ridership and economic growth of a city.  
3.3 The Washington D.C. Metrorail Network  
This section introduces a case study at this stage in order to use it to illustrate the 
methodology throughout its development. Washington D.C. Metro is one of the 
busiest public transportation systems in the U.S. relative to the city’s population. 
According to American Public Transportation Association (2016), the Washington 
D.C. Metro is the third-busiest rapid transit system in the U.S. with respect to its 
number of passenger trips. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority 
(WMATA 2016) reported that roughly 640,000 passenger trips in the city were made 
on a daily basis in the year of 2016.  
 
The Washington D.C. Metro is a critical and active public transportation system that 
serves different districts of the city along with suburban areas of Virginia and 
Maryland. The metro in Maryland and Virginia mostly operates on surface or 
elevated levels, while it is mainly subway in District of Columbia. This heavy rail 
rapid transit network contains 91 stations−9 of which are transfer stations that enable 
individuals to exchange across metro lines within the network if needed−and 140 
links that are distributed over six color-coded lines, Red, Blue, Orange, Yellow, 





solid lines operating on a full-time schedule and dotted Yellow lines operating on a 
limited schedule. The shaded part of Silver line is under construction as of 2018.  
Table 3.1 shows the counts of stations for each line as well as the number of links in 
each color-coded line. These counts exclude components that do not operate on a full-
time schedule.  
 
By observing the Washington D.C. Metro map, one can detect some color-coded lines 
that share the same tracks and metro stations along these routes. These shared 
components are treated as respective single links in studying the Washington D.C. 
Metro in a network form. 
 
Table 3.1 Number of stations and links in each color-coded line 
Color-coded lines Number of stations Number of links 
Red 27 26 
Orange  26 23 
Blue 27 26 
Green 21 21 
Yellow 17 16 








Figure 3.3. Washington D.C. Metro network (Washington D.C. Metro Fiscal Year 
Budget 2018). 
 
3.4 Network Topological Analysis  
Topological analysis begins with defining the network components, such as that of 
the Washington D.C. Metro; then followed by a brief introduction to networks 
sufficient to define the theoretical foundation necessary to analyze the network 







1. Mapping the Washington D.C. Metro in the form of a graph, defining its 
components, and studying the fundamental elements at the framework level; 
2. Introducing general features of networks and defining their characteristics;  
3. Analyzing the topological characteristics and properties of the Washington D.C. 
Metro; and 
4. Investigating the presence of small-world and scale-free phenomena in networks, 
explicitly for the Washington D.C. Metro network. 
 
Figure 3.2 shows these four steps of topological analysis. 
 
 
Figure 3.4. The metro network topological analysis in four steps. 
 
3.4.1 Metrorail network in a form of graph and its basic features 
As previously stated in Chapter 1, a network is a collection of some nodes together 





undirected and carry weight or not. This section examines the nature and different 
categories of nodes and links in a metro network through topological mapping of a 
metrorail network and characterizes the network type. 
 
 In the public transportation network (PTN) literature, various categories of 
topological graphs are recognized to model a transportation network. Based on the 
pattern of connections of links among nodes, four types of topological graphs 
containing: L-space, B-space, P-space and C-space are distinguished for representing 
a bus transportation networks (BTN) as provided by Von Ferber (2009). In a bus 
transportation network,  
 
• L-space graph denotes each station by a node and each path by a link in a manner 
that there is only one link to connect any two consecutive nodes of i and j. An L-
space graph is shown in Fig. 3.3 a. 
• B-space graph, shown in Fig. 3.3 b characterizes both routes and stations as 
nodes and somewhat is similar to a bipartite graph. In a B-space graph, a subset 
of square shape nodes that represents routes and another subset of circle shape 
nodes that represents stations are structured such that square shape nodes connect 
to only circle shape nodes of another subset. This is consistent with the structure 
of a bipartite graph. 
• P-space graph shown in Fig. 3.3 c is a projection of B-space graph to the set of 





• C-space is a projection of B-space graph to the set of square shape nodes 
representing routes in a network as shown in Fig. 3.3 d. 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Four types of topological graphs in transportation studies: (a) L-space, (b) 
B-space, (c) P-space, (d) C-space. 
 
Although the above categories are defined for a bus transportation network, an L-
space graph is analogous to the nodes and links arrangement of a metro network 
representation and is a suitable topological representation to be adopted for a metro 
network. Thus, a metrorail network in the form of a graph illustrates stations by 
nodes, while links refer to metro tunnels, bridges, above grounds rail tracks and any 
other components connecting the stations together. Derrible and Kennedy (2009) 
summarized two categories for nodes in a metro network including transfer stations 
and terminal stations. Also, two types of links incorporating single-use link or single-
link and multiple-use links or multi-links. Transfer or interchange stations often 
correspond to the locations in different places of a line where the train stops for a few 





travel, while terminal stations are at the end of a route where a train can launch or 
terminate a trip. Single-use link applies to a track that connects two sequential 
stations; whereas multiple-use links are two or more parallel segments that connect 
two consecutive stations.  
 
To analyze the topology of Washington D.C. Metro network, mapping the metro 
network into topological graph is necessary as described by Zhang et al. (2018). 
Figure 3.4 illustrates the topological graph of the Washington D.C. Metro network by 
assigning a number to each station. This network shares the characteristics of a 







Figure 3.6. Topological graph of Washington D.C. Metro network. 
 
3.4.2 Basic definitions and measurements necessary to analyze a network topology 
As previously discussed, the behavior of a given network is highly dependent on 
those patterns of connection and interaction. Thus, defining network properties and 
utilizing methods and tools to determine the network patterns of connection are 





in a computationally explicit and contained manner, this section introduces a notional 
network that is a portion of the Washington D.C. Metro topological graph with 17 
nodes and 27 links as shown in Fig 3.5 for illustrating computations.  
 
 








For a network, a topology vector as a graph G is specified as: 
 
 G= [S, E] (3.1) 
 
where G represents a graph, S is the number of all nodes, i.e., stations, and E is the 
number of all links, i.e., edges. Identifying the nodes by unique integers in S, such as: 
 
 S= [si|i=1,2,3, 4,..	#] (3.2) 
 
is beneficial for representing the network mathematically. Then, eij denotes the link 
that connects node i to node j expressed as: 
 
 E= [eij|i, j=1,2,3, 4, . . #]                    (3.3) 
 
Equally each link can be expressed also as eij =(i,j). Such an arrangement provides a 
link list for the network. Referring to Fig. 3.5, the vector G has 17 nodes and 27 links 
as: 
 
 G= [17, 27] (3.4) 
 
For complex networks, however, this illustration might be ambiguous. An improved 
representation of a network that effectively shows the state of the connection between 





association between each pair of nodes. In another word, the adjacency matrix defines 
the pattern of connectivity between each pair of nodes in mathematical terms. 
Different mathematical terms are available that are suitable for simple networks as 
well as for multi-links or self-links, connecting two nodes by more than one link or 
connecting a link to itself, respectively. Newman (2010) summarized two adjacency 
matrices for simple graphs and non-simple graphs. In a simple graph, the elements in 
Aij take on values of one if there is a link between nodes i and j and the elements are 
equal to zero if there is no link between i and j. 
 
Zhang et al. (2018) defined a simple adjacency matrix that is applicable to simple and 
non-simple networks specifically in transportation, denoted as *+, = [aij]0×0 where: 
 
 aij=2
    ∞      for nodes i and j not connected directly	
1       for a direct link between nodes i and j
0      		for i=j, connecting a node with itself
 (3.5) 
 










Many of the networks studied in different technical areas have used binary entries of 
0 or 1 in such adjacency matrices. The concept of network links, however, varies 
across fields, such as transportation versus ecological systems. In these instances, 
variations in interaction strengths are essential to the networks ability to carry on 
respective basic (Yook 2001).  
 
In non-simple graphs, the elements contain a number equal to the multiplicity of links 
between two nodes to represent multi-links, and a self-link is denoted by two since a 
self-linking a node connects to itself by one link including its two ends. A non-simple 
graph and its correspondent adjacency matrix are shown in Fig. 3.6. 
 
 







Representing link strength variation requires the use of a weighted adjacency matrix 
in which the elements are no longer binary. Weighted networks are often perceived to 
be more difficult to analyze than unweighted equivalents. In many cases, however, 
one may apply standard techniques for unweighted graphs to weighted ones by using 
a mapping from a weighted network to an unweighted multigraph (Newman 2004). 
 
The adjacency matrix of a digraph has a slightly different form compared to the 
adjacency matrix of simple graph previously introduced. The elements of a simple 
graph are one if there is a connection between each pair of i and j. However, the 
elements of a digraph adjacency matrix are one if there is a link between node j with 
an arrow indicating a direction to node i, and is zero if there is no link between them. 
Figure 3.7 comparatively demonstrates the adjacency matrices of a simple graph and 
a digraph containing three nodes. It should be noted that values of one correspond to 
the inflows to a node. In the case of multi-links directed networks, elements in an 
adjacency matrix are greater than one. However in self-link directed networks, 
diagonal elements are one instead of being two as the commonly depicted in the 
representation for self-link in adjacency matrices of undirected networks. Analyzing a 
directed network often entails converting a directed network to undirected one using 
conversion mechanisms as provided by Newman (2010). In the current work, the 








Figure 3.9 Comparison of simple graph and digraph and their correspondent 
adjacency matrices. 
 
Network topological analysis additionally requires consideration of several 
fundamental quantitative properties applicable to transportation networks, such as the 
node degree, average node degree, walk, path, path length, geodesic path, network’s 
diameter, characteristic path length or average path length, density, global clustering 
coefficient, local clustering coefficient and network average clustering coefficient as 
subsequently described. 
 
The degree of node i (or the valency of node) specified by Ki is the number of nodes 
that have the direct connection with it or the number of adjacency nodes connected to 
the ith focal node. The node degree can be computed in terms of the adjacency matrix 
in an undirected network as follows: 
 






where i is the focal node, j is the number of adjacency nodes, and n is the total nodes 
in the network. The average degree or mean degree of an undirected graph denoted by 




i=1  (3.8) 
 
Using Eqs. (3.7) and (3.8), the average node degree for the network shown in Fig. 3.5 
equates to 2.12 which means every station is linked to 2.12 other stations. 
 
In graph theory, a walk denoted as W is a finite non-null sequence of 
W=s1e12s2e23….srerr+1 whose terms are alternating between nodes and links such that 
for 1 ≤ 6 ≤	r, the ends of eii +1 are si and si+1; which means each link endpoints are 
the two nodes adjacent to it (Bondy 1976). A walk between node si and sr is expressed 
as a (si-sr)-walk, and the nodes si and sr are the origin and terminus of W, respectively. 
The length of W, in this case, is the integer r. For example in the graph shown in Fig. 
3.5, the (s9-s14)-walk is described as: 
 
 (s9-s14)-walk = s9 e9,12 s12 e12,13 s13 e13,14 s14 (3.9) 
 
In any case, where the nodes are distinct, the walk defines a path. Thus, a path is a 
sequence of any nodes in the network such that every consecutive pair of nodes in the 
sequence is connected by a link (Newman 2004). In some literature, a path in a 





where every sequence of nodes connected by directed links and with the restriction 
that all links have the same direction. 
 
Path length is the number of links in a specific path, and the geodesic path (or the 
shortest path) is a path with the minimum number of links. Thus, the minimum 
number of links that need to be traversed along the path between two nodes of si and 
sj defines the geodesic path, denoted as dij. It offers a basis to introduce the concept of 
a network’s diameter labeled as D, defined as the maximum number of links to 
navigate along all possible paths. 
  
The characteristic path length (or average path length) L is the mean over all geodesic 
path lengths dij for all possible pairs of nodes in a network as follows: 
 
 L= 1n(n-1)∑ diji≠j                    (3.10) 
 
It is necessary to avoid including the unconnected nodes in the characteristic path 
length formulation to prevent divergence. Costa et al. (2007) noted that even without 
including the unconnected nodes, this definition of characteristic path length still 
possesses a problem as it introduces distortion to the network. Nonetheless, this 






The maximum number of links in a simple graph is the number of pairs of distinct 
nodes; thus, in a network with n nodes, the maximum number of links (or edges) 
denoted by EMax is: 
 





Network density denoted as ρ is a fraction of the number of links with respect to the 
possible maximum number of links expresses as: 
 
 ρ = EEMax
                  (3.12) 
 
Clustering as an important property of a network identifies a subset of nodes that are 
linked significantly stronger to each other than to nodes outside the subset. It is 
computed by graph clustering algorithms (Hartmann et al. 2014). A clustering 
coefficient Ci for a node i is computed based on the likelihood of cliquishness of two 
connected nodes among a greater group of connected nodes. Watts and Strogatz 
(1998) asserted that the clustering coefficient Ci measures the cliquishness of a 
typical neighborhood, whereas characteristic path length L measures the typical 
separation in the graph. The clustering coefficient occurs at two levels: local and 
global. Global clustering coefficient CG is defined based on open and closed triplets 
of nodes. An open triplet is a three-node case connected by two links, and a closed 
triplet is a three-node connected by three links producing a triangle. Global clustering 





or closed triplets in a network (Ostroumova Prokhorenkova and Samosvat 2014). This 
definition is applicable for both directed and undirected networks. On the other hand, 
a local clustering coefficient in undirected graphs Ci is defined as the fraction of 
possible interconnections between the neighbors of si over the total potential links for 
node si. Node si with a node degree of Ki has at most Ki (Ki -1)/2 links among the 
nodes. Denoting eni as the number of links between neighbors of si, the local 





                 (3.13) 
 
Network average clustering coefficient C4 is defined as the mean of local clustering 
coefficient Ci for all the nodes as: 
 
 C4 =1n∑ Ci
n
i=1                 (3.14) 
 
In the existence of some node/nodes with node degree 1 in the network the local 
clustering coefficient is not well-defined. In some network literatures, it is common to 
remove those nodes with node degree of 1 in the local clustering coefficient 
calculation. However, this approach is not used in this paper. Instead, in the presence 
of node/nodes with node degree 1, which means the absence of well-defined 
clustering coefficient, the definition of the global network efficiency is used to 





to distance is the global efficiency (EG) (also called efficiency). Its definition as 
proposed by Latora and Marchiori (2001) is a measure of the flow efficiency between 
nodes i and j. In fact, the global efficiency is an indicator of node connectivity of a 











Equation (3.15) employs the adjacency matrix provided in Eq. (2.6) that is 
appropriate only for L-space networks. Floyd (1962) provided an algorithm for 
computing network efficiency. Also, Eqs. (2.10) and (2.14) are for computing the 
characteristic path length and average clustering coefficient of the network shown in 
Fig. 3.5. The characteristics of the portion of Washington D.C. Metro network are 














Table 3.2 Characteristics of the portion of Washington D.C. Metro network 
Characteristics of metro Network Calculated value for the Washington D.C. 
Metro 
Node n 17.00 
Link 27.00 
Average node degree K4 2.120 
Characteristic path length L 3.270 
Diameter of network D 7.000 
Network cluster coefficient C4 Is not defined 
Network efficiency EG 0. 423 
 
3.4.3 Washington D.C. Metro topological analysis 
This section systematically analyzes the Washington D.C. Metro network topology. 
The vector G = [S, E] of Eq. (3.1) is used to represent the stations and links in this 
metro network. Demonstrating the state of connections between any pairs of stations 
in a metro network requires an adjacency matrix introduced by Eq. (3.5). The network 
characteristics, such as characteristic path length, clustering coefficient, efficiency, 
etc., can be obtained using the topological graph of Washington D.C. Metro shown in 
Fig. 3.5 and considering the pattern of connection among nodes. For this purpose, the 
adjacency matrix Aij = [aij]91×91 for the Washington D.C. Metro network was 
developed. The results of subsequent topological analyses of the metro network are 
based on this adjacency matrix. Using Eqs. (3.7) and (3.8) and assuming that the 





network are computed. The Washington D.C. Metro network average node degree 
equates to 2.0439. Thus, every station is linked to 2.0439 other stations. Figure 3.8 
shows the distribution of node degree for 91 stations (blue columns) in the 
Washington D.C. Metro network.  
 
  
Figure 3.10. Distribution of node degree for the Washington D.C. Metro network 
(blue columns) and the truncated binomial distribution (orange columns). 
 
Based on the adjacency matrix, utilizing the algorithm developed by Floyd (1962), 
and using Eq. (3.10), the characteristic path length of the Washington D.C. Metro 
network is calculated. Equations (3.14) and (3.15) provide the clustering coefficient 
and efficiency of the network. Table 3.2 presents the results of these calculations. The 
characteristic path length for the Washington D.C. Metro is 11.30 as the shortest path 
between any two stations, i.e., a path needs to pass through 11.30 stations on the 





























Since there are some nodes with node degree 1 in Washington D.C. Metro, its local 
clustering coefficient is not well-defined. Thus, in this paper global clustering 
coefficient is used to represent Washington D.C. Metro network average clustering 
coefficient. The global clustering coefficient is 0.038.The global clustering coefficient 
is 0.038. Network efficiency of Washington D.C. Metro network is equal to 0.14320. 
This measurement corresponds to the state of the network without any components 
failure. Initial metro network efficiency is the basis of calculating vulnerability, 
robustness and resilience of the metro in the case of failure and disruption. It should 
be noted that the dotted lines in Fig. 3.1 is not included in this study to compute the 
characteristic path length. However, the dotted Yellow line is included in calculating 
the clustering coefficients. The stations in the shaded region of the Sliver line are 
















Table 3.3 Initial Characteristics of Washington D.C. Metro network 
Characteristics of metro 
Network 
Calculated value for the 
Washington D.C. Metro 
Interpretations 
Number of nodes n 91 91stations 
 Number of links 140 
 
93 links with lines sharing the 
same tracks treated as a singly link 




2.0439 Each Station averagely connects to 
2.0439 other station 
Characteristic path length 
L= 1n(n-1)∑ diji≠j                    
11.30 The average shortest path between 
any two stations is 11.30 links 
Diameter of network D  28 The longest geodesic path in link 
count, among all network possible 
geodesic paths 
Network cluster coefficient 
C4 = 1n∑ Ci
n
i=1    												 
0.0380* The average of local clustering of 
all nodes as the fractions of 
neighboring connections to node si 










0.1432 An indicator of node connectivity 
that is proportional to the 
reciprocal of shortest distance 
* This measurement is based on using global clustering coefficient due to absence of well-defined local 





3.4.4 Small-World and Scale-Free phenomena in networks  
Beyond the basic definitions of networks discussed earlier, it is necessary to 
investigate the presence of a small-world network and a scale-free network as two 
important phenomena in analyzing networks’ topology. In order to understand a 
small-world network, it is beneficial to describe the characteristic of Regular lattice 
networks and Random networks shown in Fig. 3.9. Regular lattice is one kind of an 
extreme graph that has the minimum heterogeneity. In fact, by looking at the degree 
probability distribution PK, which gives the probability as a frequency of having a 
node with node degree equal to Ki, the level of heterogeneity can be easily recognized 
(Sole andValverde 2004). In regular lattice network’s structure, nodes are only 
connected to their neighbors and the lowest randomness is observed in their pattern of 
connections. In other words, the probability of randomly rewiring links of the 
network is close to zero (Pr =0). In its counterpart of a random network, the nodes are 
rewired randomly or the probability of randomly rewiring links is close to 1 (Pr =1).   
 
Watts and Strogatz (1998) used similar networks shown in Fig. 3.9 to describe the 
small-world network. As it is shown, ring regular lattice here is highly clustered and 
presents large characteristic path length. Characteristic path length is proportional to 
(n/2K)===. However, the random network is not clustered and clustering coefficient is 
almost zero. Also, characteristic path length is short and proportional to ln(n)/ln(K4). 
They showed that small-world networks are an intermediate case between regular and 







Figure 3.11. Regular network, small-world network and random network. 
 
Despite the large network size, small-world networks tend to have a high clustering 
coefficient C4	along with a small characteristic path length L. Thus, in most networks 
and in particular social networks, a small-world network should meet two conditions:  
 
 A ≅> ( ln (n)
ln(K4)
) (3.16a) 
 C4 > ( D
4
0
 )                     (3.16b) 
 
Latora and Marchiori (2002) justified characterizing a small-world network by only 
its clustering coefficient and characteristic path length on the basis of demonstrated 
suitability for social networks; while it suffers from some limitations in order to be 
used in the realm of weighted transportation networks and/or disconnected networks, 
i.e., networks with at least a pair of nodes such that no path has those nodes as its 





clustering coefficient are not well defined, such as in the case of disconnected and 
weighted networks. In addition, in the circumstance where the physical length of the 
links is important or the size of the network is small, the above method fails to draw 
any conclusion. For investigating the small-world phenomenon in those networks, 
other formulations based on network efficiency are necessary. In general, small-world 
and random networks may have a distribution of node degree following a binomial 
distribution (Porekar 2002) as: 
 
 PK=709EF 8?
F(1 − ?)09E9F                  (3.17) 
 
where PK = probability (P) of node degree K among all its possible values, n = 
number of nodes, and p = probability of two nodes being randomly connected. 
According to Barabasi (2016) the appropriate type of the degree distribution of a 
random network is the binomial distribution. However, when the number of nodes in 
the network is relatively large and the average node degree is small, the binomial 
distribution may be approximated well by a Poisson distribution.  
 
For the Washington D.C. Metro network, considering an average node degree of 
2.0439, each node has (n-1) trials to be randomly connected to other nodes. Each trial 







1. Each trial has two possible outcomes of being randomly connected to other 
nodes or being not connected; 
2. All (n-1) trials are independent of each other;  
3. The probability of two nodes being randomly connected remain constant from 
trial to trial and could be calculated as: 
 
 p= Average node degree(n-1) 	= 0.023 (3.18) 
 
The third property of the binomial distribution might not hold well in the case of 
metro networks since a node is more likely to be connected directly to adjacent nodes 
than others far removed. Implementing p=0.023 in Eq. (3.17) and having k to take on 
values of (0,1,2,…90), the binomial distribution model could be easily produced. 
However, in the Washington D.C. Metro network the values of k are 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. 
Therefore, a truncated binomial distribution in the domain of real data is a more 


















  (3.19) 
 
For a truncated distribution, Eq. (3.18) does not apply, and p should be calculated 
based on the mean value definition for discrete random variables as follows: 
 
 Average node degree = ∑ (iPKT(i))
i=5





1. Using Eq. (3.20) p is recalculated as 0.0252 and subsequently the truncated 
binomial distribution is reproduced based on the new p. The truncated 
binomial distribution model (orange columns) are shown in Fig. 3.8. 
 
The chi-square goodness of fit test is performed to assess the reliability of the model. 
The comparison of the observed (Of) frequencies of the network with frequencies 
expected (Ef) from the binomial distribution model (without the truncation) provides 
the values for computing chi-square distribution statistic shown as Z[: 
 
 Z[=∑




i=1  =1.36 (3.21) 
 
The critical value of the chi-square test statistic with degrees of freedom of 4, i.e., 
sample size- number of binomial distribution parameters -1, and a level of 
significance of 5% is 9.49. This critical value is larger than computed Z[ and, 
therefore, supports the hypothesis that the Washington D.C. Metro network follows a 
binomial distribution. The truncated distribution enhances this fit. 
 
In addition, Eqs. (3.16a) and (3.16b) can be used  roughly to better determine whether 
or not the Washington D.C. Metro network is a small-world network. Table 3.4 
shows the two necessary conditions and their values that relate L and C4. For the 
Washington D.C. Metro network, the global clustering coefficient is used as the 





coefficient. The characteristic path length fulfills the correlation of Eq. (3.16a). Thus, 
according to the formalism mentioned above, Washington D.C. Metro network is a 
small-world network.  
 
Table 3.4 Conditions on L and C4 for the Washington D.C. Metro network 
















Regardless of categorizing a network to be of a small-world or not, in the presence of 
a power model for node degree (K) and probability (PK), the network is most likely to 
be a scale-free network. Scale-free networks are characterized by a highly 






where ] and ` are the parameters of the power curve and K is a possible node degree 
value. Using nonlinear curve fitting, ] and ` can be obtained where the latter 
signifies the slope of the line on logarithmic scales, and frequently varies between 2 





For scale-free networks, the power-law indicates that the majority of nodes have 
small node degree, and the probability of nodes with small node degree is higher than 
otherwise. Thus, a few nodes with significant node degree exist which are easily 
identifiable in the network. The nodes with high node degree are called hubs; 
therefore, scale-free networks demonstrate the existence of hubs in a network. The 
removal of nodes with small node degree does not change the pattern of connectivity 
and the structure of other nodes, hence, has no effect on the whole topology of the 
network (Albert et al. 2000). In the scale-free networks, nodes tend to remain 
connected and the characteristic length tends to remain small. This property is 
consistent with the definition of network’s robustness. Thus, scale-free networks 
display robustness under a random node removal even by a high failure rate, yet are 
vulnerable to intentional attack (Crucitti et al. 2004). The network exhibits a low level 
of robustness under the removal of few vital nodes with a higher node degree.  
 
It is noteworthy to mention that a network can show the characteristics of small-world 
and scale-free phenomena at the same time, and these two properties do not have any 
conflict with each other. Investigating the existence of small-world network in a 
metro system depends on the network being weighted or unweighted and connected 
or disconnected. For weighted transportation networks or disconnected transportation 
networks, alternative technique and mathematical formalism are necessary (Latora 
and Marchiori 2002). Exploring the presence of scale-free and small-world 
phenomena in the metro network enhances the understanding of the nature of the 





Furthermore, nonlinear regression graphical analysis illustrated in Fig. 3.10 displays 
the nonlinear fitting of the relative frequency ?D versus the node degree value K. The 





The nonlinear relationship produced ] = 0.12 and ` = 1.34 with the latter smaller than 
2. However, this fit is not a reliable one; typically power law graphs are not reliable 
when the range of the data and sample size are small. Nonetheless, the Washington 
D.C. Metro network indeed has a few nodes with large node degree and the majority 
of nodes have small node degree. Thus, with a reasonable approximation, the 
Washington D.C. Metro is considered as a scale-free network too. As discussed 
earlier, scale-free networks show more robustness when they are subjected to random 
failures compared to intentional disruptions.  
 
The basic prerequisite information presented in this section is necessary for 








Figure 3.12. Nonlinear fitting of the relative frequency with node degree for 
Washington D.C Metro network. 
 
3.5 Concluding Remarks and Contribution 
According to Derrible and Kennedy (2010), an efficient approach and a coherent 
basis to characterize the safety and robustness of transportation network require 
topological analysis. A topology analysis explores network form and defines the 
components that shape the network. It also describes the network connectivity and its 
characteristics. It is a primary step of network analysis and is the basis for assessing 
the network resilience and its attributes. This chapter serves as a network topological 
analysis of the Washington D.C. Metro and includes developing a metro rail model in 
a form of a graph and obtaining its basic features by network topology analysis. The 
analytical work demonstrates that the Washington D.C. Metro with its 91 stations and 
140 links is an L-shaped network with the presence of small-world and scale-free 





phenomena. This chapter proposes a new probabilistic method to investigate the 
presence of small-world in the network. The outcome of Chapter 3 helps to better 







Chapter 4: Vulnerability and Resilience of Metrorail 
Networks, Quantification with Washington D.C. as a Case 
Study* 
4.1. Introduction 
Infrastructures systems provide populations in urban areas with amenities and 
services. While the need for infrastructure systems in societies is well recognized, 
great attention should be paid toward enhancing the ability and resilience of 
infrastructure systems to deliver a desired quality level of service. Many numbers of 
infrastructure systems have been designed and implemented without much 
consideration for inevitable future changes such as rapid urban areas development. 
The U.N.’s Human Settlements Program predicts a near doubling of the world’s 
population living in urbanized areas by 2050 (Lederer 2013). This statistic alone 
illustrates the dire need for infrastructures development and improvement in order to 
address imminent challenges facing communities. 
 
 Urban rail transit networks, also termed metrorail or metro networks, are essential 
transportation infrastructures, which have attracted users in increasing numbers 
worldwide by facilitating transportation in urban life. The growth of a metro network 
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is inextricably intertwined with the growth of the city and its economy. Metro 
networks are complex systems consisting of a large number of interacting nodes and 
links representing stations and connecting rail segments, respectively. They are 
characterized by steady speed, schedule predictability and large capacity, and 
typically form the artery of urban public transportation (Latora and Marchiori 2002; 
Angelouis and Fisk 2006; Derrible and Kennedy 2010).  
 
The London metro network, which opened in 1863, was the first metro network with 
the ridership up to approximately 30,000 passengers daily. In 2014, there were metro 
networks in more than 157 cities in the world, with roughly 150 million passenger 
trips being made on a daily basis (UITP 2015). Metrorail networks have made a great 
contribution to city expansions, intensified urbanization, and economic growth. In 
return, urbanization has propelled the development and growth of metro networks, 
thereby introducing complexity to such networks.  
 
In a complex system, disruptions or even lesser perturbations may curtail 
functionality of the system. In particular, any disruption of such an interaction and 
equilibrium potentially impacts commuters’ wellbeing, has a dramatic effect on the 
safety of commuters, and influences the resilience and reliability of Metro operation 
(Cadarsoa et al. 2013; Nguyen, Bdugin and Marais, 2015), in addition to direct and 
indirect losses associated with performance loss. For example, the December 2017 
derailing of an Amtrak train traveling from Seattle to Portland resulted in three 





Sandy knocked out of commission several New York City subway lines due to tunnel 
flooding severely diminishing the number of normal weekday riders (FEMA 2013). 
The September 2011 accident in the Shanghai Metro resulted in 271 injuries and 
significant recovery costs (Mu 2011). The National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB 2010) reported an accident in June 2009 on an aboveground track on the Red 
Line of the Washington D.C. Metro that resulted in 52 injuries, nine fatalities, and 12 
million US dollars in direct losses. These events, like many, demonstrate the types of 
threats to citizens, facilities and infrastructures. Additionally, they illustrate the 
importance of maintaining the safe operation of metro networks and the need for 
enhancing metro resilience and robustness by identifying the vulnerability of the 
network.  
 
The concept of vulnerability is increasingly being used to quantify the impact of any 
adverse event on the performance of transportation networks. In a metrorail network, 
robustness refers to the ability of a network to withstand residual node connectivity 
following a failure event, and vulnerability relates to the negative changes in the 
global efficiency of a network in a post-failure state. Compared to reliability analysis, 
which is a probabilistic measure of the network connectivity; robustness and 
vulnerability analyses are more focused on the consequences due to abnormal events 
(Jenelius et al. 2006; Jenelius and Mattsson, 2015). According to Nelson, Gillespie-
Marthaler et al. (2019) the concepts of robustness, vulnerability, and reliability are 
frequently used to frame assessments related to system quality. For example, 





Yang et al. (1996) assessed the reliability of water distribution systems. Li and He 
(2002) proposed a method to evaluate seismic system reliability of large lifeline 
systems. Improving the reliability and robustness of a system by identifying 
vulnerable components and preserving them is of paramount importance to enhance 
the system resilience and is a path to sustain a reliable system. 
 
Many attempts have been made to assess not only the resilience of networks in 
general, but also of metrorail networks particularly. Derrible and Kennedy (2010) 
suggested network topological analysis as a fundamental initial step to assess the 
resilience of a network. Newman (2010) introduced basic and advanced features of a 
network. Watts and Strogatz (1998) investigated the existence of small-world 
phenomenon in a network, and Sen and Dasgupta (2003) examined this phenomenon 
in the Indian railway network. Latora and Marchiori (2002) also studied the existence 
of a small-world property for the Boston subway. Statistical analysis of 22 public 
transportation networks in Polish cities revealed the complex nature of their 
topological structures (Sienkiewicz and Holyst 2005). Derrible and Kennedy 
(2009)analyzed subway systems using updated graph theory. Haznagy et al. (2015) 
identified similarities and differences within urban public transportation systems of 
five Hungarian cities using complex network theory by comparing their network 
descriptors. In the paper by Haznagy et al. (2015) critical nodes are ranked based on 
their greatest centrality measures that typically refer to the nodes in central positions 
or transfer nodes in the network where exchanging route possibilities exist. Wu et al. 





Kong, London, Paris and Tokyo and compared their relative network efficiencies. 
Network efficiency is the indicator of network connectivity. Wang (2015) quantified 
the robustness of metro networks subjected to random failures and targeted attacks. 
Recently, a general framework for assessing a large-scale metro was suggested based 
on analyzing its vulnerability and recovery rapidity within a unified metric(Zhang et 
al. 2017). The assessment by Zhang et al. (2017) primarily focused on analyzing the 
changed connectivity after the removal of only network node(s) without considering 
link removal. 
 
This chapter presents a method based on graph theory for analyzing network 
resilience using the Washington D.C. Metro of 91 stations and 140 links as a case 
study. To achieve this main objective, this chapter uses topology analysis results of a 
metro network that previously is mapped in a form of a graph in Chapter 3. Mapping 
a metro network into a graph and analyzing its characteristics provides a basis to 
evaluate its efficiency means by which the measure of efficient flow between any two 
nodes, and vulnerability and robustness as primary components for assessing network 
resilience. Then, this chapter examines the changes in connectivity and measures the 
resilience loss in the network after one-at-a-time node and link removal. Previous 
resilience assessments of metrorail networks have not accounted for link removal in 
the analysis. This lack of investigation might be a result of relying on the assumption 
that link removal insignificantly impacts L-space networks. However, this paper 






The chapter is organized as follows: The next section describes the vulnerability 
assessment and resilience metric development methodology used in this chapter, 
which includes three subsections of proposing a general framework to assess the 
network resilience, network efficiency prior to and following any failure event, 
network vulnerability under two circumstances of node and link failures, and the 
network resilience index; the chapter 4 methodology outline is shown in Fig. 4.1.The 
last section concludes the study and discusses the implications of the findings as well 
as future expansion applied to this topic. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 A proposed vulnerability assessment and resilience metric development 
methodology  
 
4.2. Methodology for Unweighted Network Resilience Assessment 
4.2.1. General frame work to assess the network resilience 
The objective of this chapter is to develop a general framework to assess the 





resilience of a network and understand how the corresponding network works, 
studying its network structure is necessary. A systematic approach for assessing the 
resilience of a network requires characterizing its form, size, dependencies and 
interdependencies under normative sources of disruption. Size and complexity of a 
system, along with a topological analysis, determine appropriate metrics for the 
resilience of a network. Therefore, the general resilience frame work consists of the 
following three steps: 
 
1. Defining a system in a network-form that includes signifying nodes and links and 
the pattern of connectivity among nodes by links; 
2. Analyzing topology by computing node degree, average node degree and 
adjacency matrix offering a basis for calculating characteristic path length and 
network efficiency; and 
3. Assessing resilience based on vulnerability and robustness analysis by computing 
a resilience index. The vulnerability, robustness and resilience index are the basis 
on network efficiency. 






Figure 4.2. A general framework to assess the network resilience including three steps 






4.2.2. Network efficiency prior to and following failure events  
Measuring the changes of the network efficiency prior to and following any 
disruptive event is the basis for further calculations, i.e., vulnerability, robustness, 
resilience index, herein. Changes in network connectivity alter the network topology, 
and hence its efficiency. The efficiency of large metro networks is affected by either 
node or link failures. Node failures can be linked to any disruption that results in the 
removal of one or more stations from a metro network. Link failures are other sources 
of disruption, such as tunnel or rail failures. Thus, two failure cases are considered in 
this study: 
 
1. One- at-a-time node failure in the network 
2. One- at-a-time link failure in the network 
 
The network efficiency for an unweighted network is calculated using Eq. (3.15). 
Referring to the network efficiency result presented in Table 3.3, Washington D.C. 
Metro’s initial network efficiency is 0.1432.  
 
4.2.3. Model metro network vulnerability, robustness and resilience 
Evaluating the vulnerability of a network requires measuring changes between the 
initial network connectivity, i.e., prior to any failures, and post-failure network 
connectivity. Hence, the vulnerability can be associated with network efficiency and 









                   (4.1a) 
 V=Max Vi                   (4.1b) 
 
where EG is the efficiency of a network before node or link removal, and 	EGi is the 
efficiency of a metro network after removal of nodes or links in a metro network. The 
residual connectivity after node or link removal 	EGi can be considered as a measure 
of its robustness. The vulnerability of network after removal of a node or link is Vi, 
and V is the vulnerability of a whole network.  
 
4.2.3.1. Washington D.C. Metro vulnerability with node failures 
The vulnerability assessment of the Washington D.C. Metro network covers two 
cases: (1) node removal one at a time, and (2) link removal one at a time. For both 
cases, Eqs. (4.1a) and (4.1b) are used to calculate the vulnerability. In Eq. (4.1a), EGi 
refers to the efficiency of a network after a node removal or a link removal providing 
measures of respective robustness. Characterizing the node connectivity is the key 
element for measuring robustness, which is a necessary pursuit for vulnerability 
assessment. In order to calculate EGi, Eq. (3.15) is used with a new set of dij after node 
or link removal and regenerating the network.  
 
Transitioning the focus in this section to the vulnerability assessment in the event of a 
node failure, the efficiency of the network after removing each station is evaluated 





as to assess all new geodesic paths dij for each of the 91 stations by running the code 
only once. The developed algorithm automatically evaluates the new adjacency 
matrix and subsequently creates new geodesic paths and network efficiency. The size 
of the adjacency matrix after one node removal is 90 times 90. Consequently, the end 
result is expressed as a vector B=[bij]1X91, whose bij corresponds to EGi after 
removing each station. Figure 4.3 displays the vulnerability profile of the metro 
network when subjected to node removal for all 91 nodes. Also, Table 4.1 lists the ten 
most critical stations along with their associated network vulnerability values. 
 
 
Figure 4.3.Vulnerability of Washington D.C. Metro network subjected to node 


































Table 4.1 The ten most critical stations in the Washington D.C Metro network 
Rank 
order 
Name of the station Station 
number 
Node degree Network Vulnerability 
Magnitude (%) 
1 L' Enfant Plaza  38 5 29.78 
2 Gallery Place 12 4 23.42 
3 Metro Center 13 4 17.43 
4 Federal Center SW 67 2 16.70 
5 Pentagon 48 3 16.22 
6 Rosslyn 73 3 15.30 
7 Capital South 66 2 15.09 
8 Farragut North 14 2 14.23 
9 Eastern Market 65 2 13.79 
10 Court House 74 2 13.36 
 
Equation (4.1b) equates the network vulnerability to the maximum vulnerability 
among all nodes removed once at a time. Thus, the vulnerability of the network is 
almost 0.30 and L' Enfant Plaza Station is of the greatest vulnerability in the 
Washington D.C. Metro network. By removing the L' Enfant Plaza Station, the 
efficiency of the network would be drastically reduced by 29.78%. While a 
considerable likelihood of correlation between the efficiency reduction and the 
removal of the station with higher node degree exists, it is not always the case. By 
removing the Federal Center SW station with a node degree of 2, the connectivity 





a higher node degree of 3. In addition, Fort Totten station (node 6) has a node degree 
of 4 and is not ranked among the ten most critical stations. The majority of the critical 
nodes are the transfer stations located in the downtown area and are heavily used by 
local commuters. The other critical nodes are connected to transfer stations and are 
responsible for tying all four quadrants of Washington D.C. to the downtown area. In 
the event of a critical station removal, the impacted quadrants of the city would fail to 
be connected to the downtown area. 
 
4.2.3.2. Washington D.C. metro vulnerability analysis with link failures  
In this section, the vulnerability assessment is enhanced to account for link removals 
in the network as presented herein. In this assessment, by using the link removal 
method, i.e., removing one link at a time from the network, the regenerated network 
is developed, after which the associated network efficiency is derived using Eq. 
(3.15). Measuring network efficiency in this case is based on the Floyd (1962) 
algorithm by changing the adjacency matrix after each link removal and not changing 
the size of the adjacency matrix. Table 4.2 shows the vulnerability measurements for 
the fifteen most critical links in the Washington D.C. Metro network. In Table 4.2, 







Table 4.2 The fifteen most critical links in the Washington D.C Metro network 
Rank 
order 
Link Station names at two ends of each link Color-coded lines Vulnerability   
Magnitude (%) 
1 (13,69) (Metro center, Federal Triangle) Blue-Orange-Silver 16.07 
2 (68,69) (Smithsonian, Federal Triangle) Blue-Orange-Silver 14.42 
3 (38,68) (L' Enfant Plaza, Smithsonian) Blue-Orange-Silver 13.14 
4 (73,74) (Rosslyn, Court House) Orange-Silver 12.78 
5 (38,67) (L' Enfant plaza, Federal Center SW) Blue-Orange-Silver 12.07 
6 (13,14) (Metro Center, Farragut North) Red 11.71 
7 (48, 49) (Pentagon, Pentagon City) Blue-Yellow 11.57 
8 (74,75) (Court House, Clarendon) Orange-Silver 11.50 
9 (63,64) (Stadium Armory, Potomac Ave) Blue-Orange-Silver 11.14 
10 (75,76) (Clarendon, Virginia-Sq-GMU) Orange-Silver 10.42 
11 (14,15) (Farragut north, Dupont Circle) Red 10.14 
12 (49,50) (Pentagon City, Crystal City) Blue-Yellow 9.85 
13 (76,77) (Virginia-Sq-GMU, Ballston-MU) Orange-Silver 9.50 
14 (15,16) (Dupont Circle, Woodley Park) Red 8.86 









Based on Table 4.2, the most critical lines in the Washington D.C. Metro network are 
the Blue-Orange-Silver lines, which share the same track and therefore are considered 
as one single-use link. The most vulnerable segment of those lines is where they 
connect east Washington D.C. to the downtown area. The portion of Orange-Silver 
lines connecting western Washington D.C. to downtown and the Blue-Yellow lines 
connecting the southern part of the city to the downtown area are vulnerable as well. 
In addition, the Red line where several links connect the northwest quadrant of 
Washington D.C. to the downtown area and a segment of the Green line responsible 
for connecting the southeast quadrant of the city to the downtown area are considered 
the most vulnerable links. Notably, in analyzing link removal, the segments 
connected to one of the transfer stations are exposed to protentional threats and are 
ranked among the most critical links in the Washington D.C. Metro network.  
 
4.2.4. Resilience index 
In the network analysis literature, usually the network connectivity, which is also 
represented by the network efficiency, is the key criterion to express a network 
performance. Tracing performance changes in the network could also provide the 
basis to quantify the network resilience. Improving network resilience helps enhance 
safety, and requires appropriate resilience metrics. Resilience, defined as the 
persistence of performance under uncertainty due to a disruptive event, fundamentally 
can be measured by defining performance, a performance loss profile due to 





quantify network resilience as follows: (1) network performance before and after a 
disruptive event, and (2) network performance recovery to the initial or some other 
level of functionality. The changes in the network performance constitute the 
resilience loss in the network (Bruneau et al. 2003; Bruneau et al. 2007). In addition, 
Bruneau et al. (2003) proposed the concept of a resilience triangle to quantify the 
resilience of a system. Resilience triangle in a network represents the changes in a 
network efficiency from the time that the disruptive event happens to the time that the 
network efficiency recovers to its initial state.  
 
Figure 4.4 illustrates the concept of a resilience triangle, where	Qt on the vertical axis 
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where Re is the resilience index,	Qt is the performance of the disrupted system, 	Q0 is 
the performance before disruption, t0	is the time when the system is subjected to 








Figure 4.4. Resilience properties and resilience triangle in a system. 
 
Further, Ayyub (2014b) provided a schematic representation of a system performance 
loss due to an adverse event in the system followed by a recovery procedure to revert 
the system to the original level of system performance. Figure 3.5 shows the 
simplified version of the aforementioned schematic, which is tailored for network 
analysis purposes. The vertical axis represents the network efficiency index EGt at 
time t and the horizontal axis indicates the time t. In Fig. 3.5 the adverse event is 
assumed to lead to a failure in the network and the recovery process is assumed to 






Figure 3.5. Schematic representation of resilience triangle and robustness in a 
network. 
 
The global network efficiency could be used to represent the network performance. 
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where EGt is the network efficiency at time t, and EG0 is the initial efficiency of the 
metro network. During the time interval of th, the diminished performance system 
could be recovered to its initial performance level. Major considerations in 
enhancing network resilience are recovery strategies and associated costs. 
Henry and Ramiz-Marquez (2012)investigated the importance of recovery strategy in 





recovery sequence, but also on the recovery cost. The associated recovery cost is 
correlated with the cost of income loss due to network disruption and the cost of 
repairs. Considering the factors of recovery sequence and recovery cost, decision 
makers can embrace an effective sequential recovery scheme. Identifying an effective 
recovery strategy is necessary to enhance the resilience of a network and provides a 
better safety assessment, a more accurate cost-benefit evaluation, and risk reduction 
in the network. A detailed recovery analysis of the Washington D.C. Metro is 
described in chapter 6. 
 
4.3. Synthesis of Findings 
A metro system provides for effective transportation means with synergies in urban 
areas resulting in economic growth and equity. Enhancing the resilience of metro 
systems contributes to enhancing commuters’ safety. Methods to measure metro 
network performance, robustness and vulnerability provide a basis for measuring and 
enhancing metro resilience, operation and maintenance. This chapter adopts the 
Washington D.C. Metro as a case study and uses the topology analysis results 
presented in Chapter 3 to propose a method for analyzing vulnerabilities and 
resilience based on complex network theory. Complex network theory is a basic 
method that has been widely used in modeling urban critical infrastructure networks, 
such as transportation networks. Metro networks have non-trivial topological 
characteristics and typically the pattern of connections in their networks are not 
merely regular nor random. Thus, a metro network can be viewed as a complex 





Therefore, complex network theory works well in modeling the structural features of 
a metro network and its pattern of connectivity.  
 
Assessing the vulnerability and resilience of a metro network requires modeling its 
topology using complex network theory. Through the analytical and computational 
work presented, the vulnerability of the Washington D.C. Metro is evaluated by 
method of connectivity changes due to either node removal or link removal, one at a 
time for each type. In addition, the connectivity changes between the initial network 
connectivity (i.e., prior to any failures) and network connectivity measures after 
failure along with the resilience triangle concept are used to develop a unified metric 
of network resilience. The Washington D.C. Metro network was assessed 
comprehensively by considering two scenarios, i.e., the metro network subjected to 
node removal and link removal. The node removal vulnerability assessment identified 
the L' Enfant Plaza Station to have the greatest value. Removing the L' Enfant Plaza 
Station drastically reduces the network efficiency by 29.74%. Additionally, 
examining the link removal identified the cases, in the multi color-coded lines 
responsible for connecting east, west and south of Washington D.C. to the downtown 
area, as well as the Red and Green metro lines connecting the north-west quadrants of 
the city and the south-east quadrant of the city to the downtown area, with the most 
vulnerable links in this metro system. The reductions in efficiency for these links 
range from 16.07 % to 8.78% for the most critical links of the network. Therefore, 
exclusive attention should be given to these most vulnerable stations and metro links. 





one circle route, which protects the stations located in the downtown area, and also 
has sufficient connections to the four quadrants of the city. This idea will be 
examined in Chapter 6 of this dissertation.  
 
Enhancing the network’s resilience requires a substantial investment, yet great 






Chapter 5: Failure Analysis of Weighted Urban Rail Transit 
Networks Incorporating General Ridership Patterns* 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In any non-linear system as complex as an urban rail transit network or metrorail 
network, some incidence of perturbations of its state is inevitable. These perturbations 
can highly affect the networks’ resilience. Increasing the ability of metrorail networks 
to withstand such perturbations and improving their operational efficiency and 
performance require robustness and vulnerability assessments as key attributes of 
resilience. Most models developed for this purpose associate a network’s failures to 
binary representations of the failure of its components without incorporating weight 
factors; while all networks are best described by considering respective weights 
assigned to links.  
 
For transportation systems, most studies from the perspective of network topology 
have focused on the vulnerability under stochastic failures or deliberate attacks by 
randomly or selectively removing some nodes or links from the network (Holme and 
Kim 2002; Laporte et al. 2010; Lin and Ban 2013; Deng et al. 2013; Zhang et al. 
2018; Saadat et al. 2019); whereas few studies have considered the characteristics of 
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traffic flow through a network. This limitation may result in an incomplete view of 
transportation networks leading to suboptimal or erroneous decisions. The network’s 
structure and function are the two key concerns in the study of complex transportation 
networks, and traffic conditions are the direct embodiment of transportation network 
function. Therefore, such models could be enhanced by considering a weighted 
transportation network using traffic data for analyzing its characteristics. For instance, 
Bagler (2008) used the number of flights as the weight to analyze the distribution 
characteristics of weighted complex network eigenvalues in the airport network of 
India. Sun et al. (2015) considered the passenger flow influence in measuring the 
functional vulnerability and serviceability of the Shanghai metrorail, although from 
the perspective of line operation and not as a weighted network. Feng et al. (2017) 
analyzed the traffic flow pattern in the Beijing subway system based on trip data and 
travel time to create the weighted network. The previous studies, however, have not 
considered the actual ridership traveling on each link of the network, while ridership 
has significant influence on transportation network attributes.  
 
One challenge in assessing ridership-weighted transportation network attributes is 
characterizing passenger flow patterns. Reported spatiotemporal distribution patterns 
of passenger flow or traffic conditions are typically based on databases of real 
networks (Kerner and Klenov 2004; Ahas et al. 2010; Gao et al. 2013; Li et al. 2013). 
Anbaroğlu et al. (2015) modeled the heterogeneity of London roadways, and Wu et 





state based on collecting real data. Kurant and Thiran (2006) extracted the physical 
traffic flow from timetables of public mass transportation networks as a data source.  
 
In metrorail networks, smart metrorail cards could help in collecting ridership data, 
however, may not fully capture the number of passengers traveling on each link. The 
ideal state is to obtain ridership data on each link. Typically, collecting such data is 
not straightforward and even if it is obtainable, it would isolate the paper to a specific 
case study or some set of data. Hence, there is a need for a general model that can 
provide a good approximation for assessing ridership traveling on metrorail links. 
Ideally, such a model is universal in nature and applicable by calibration to any 
network. 
 
In the actual operation of a metrorail network, ridership directly affects the status of a 
station or links in the network in terms of connectivity importance. Correspondingly, 
it is urgent to efficiently reflect on the number of passengers that each metrorail link 
carries when analyzing metrorail network attributes during or following network 
connectivity failures.  
 
This chapter aims to address two gaps as outlined previously by proposing models to 
(1) characterize the general ridership pattern in an urban rail transit system, and (2) 
analyze a ridership-weighted network defined by associated link weights. Ridership 
serves as the basis for computing weight factors for links. These models were used 





main objective of the chapter is to utilize such failures to analyze the network 
efficiency, robustness, and vulnerability among other attributes by employing a novel 
methodology and using the Washington D.C. Metro network as a case study. By 
comparing the network efficiency before and after the failure of each node or link, the 
vulnerability as well as robustness were quantitatively calculated and the highly 
vulnerable nodes and links were identified. Assessing network vulnerability and 
robustness offers a basis to enhance the network resilience. 
 
5.2 Proposed Methodology for Assessing Ridership-Weighted Metrorail Network 
Attributes 
Analyzing a weighted metrorail network’s attributes starts by characterizing the 
topological indicators without the weights. Then, the number of passengers on each 
link is normalized1and assigned to the corresponding link as weight factors. The link-
weighted network model, i.e., weighted network, offers a basis for calculating 
network efficiency by which to measure the flow between any pair of nodes in a 
network. Finally, a vulnerability assessment is conducted by calculating the changes 
in the metrorail network efficiency due to one-at-a-time node and link removals from 
the weighted network. Different methods are available to analyze the efficiency of 
weighted networks. For instance, Newman (2004) suggested an effective technique of 
mapping weighted networks on to unweighted multigraphs and analyzing those 
                                               
1 It should be noted that the weights need not be normalized in general. For the specific application of 
this chapter and to make it concise to the expression of weighted global network efficiency, weights 






unweighted multigraphs instead. Guidotti et al. (2017) proposed using unweighted 
axillary nodes as nodal and link weights for assessing topology-based reliability of a 
network. In the case of a metrorail network with ridership considered as weights on 
links, the size of corresponding multigraphs or network with axillary nodes may 
become relatively large and could lead to analytical and computational challenges.  
This chapter proposes a novel model for evaluating the efficiency of a weighted 
metrorail network reflecting its ridership by concurrently incorporating two matrices: 
(1) an unweighted adjacency matrix, i.e., a matrix for demonstrating a pattern of 
connection in a network, and (2) weighted adjacency matrix in which the matrix 
elements represent normalized weights on links between any two nodes. The 
unweighted adjacency matrix is used to determine the shortest path, i.e., geodesic 
path between any two stations, hereafter indicated by dij. Weighted adjacency matrix 
is used to calculate the network efficiency by undertaking the sum of link weights on 
each geodesic path. The proposed methodology as shown in Fig. 5.1 consists of the 
following four steps: 
 
1. Mapping a metrorail system into a topological graph and defining nodes, links 
and pattern of connection, i.e., adjacency matrix;  
2. Analyzing topology of an unweighted metrorail network and calculating the 






3. Evaluating ridership for each link of the metrorail network by using the data 
available on each station in order to generate the weighted adjacency matrix; 
and 
4. Assessing efficiency, robustness and vulnerability of the metrorail network after 
failure events. 
 
Steps 1 and 2 are already achieved in Chapter 2 and the procedure is not replicated in 
this or following chapters. Rather, the results are used to calculate the necessary terms 
hereafter.  
These steps are detailed in subsequent sections. 
 
 






5.2.1 Defining a network and generating unweighted adjacency matrix 
According to Chapter 2, an urban metrorail transit network could be seen as a 
realization of a spatial network. In mapping a metrorail system into a topological 
graph thereof, each node represents a metrorail station, while the link between nodes 
signifies the metrorail segments, i.e., tunnel, bridge, underground, connecting track, 
etc. Network components are defined by Eq. (3.1) and network unweighted adjacency 
matrix is described by Eq. (3.5). In complex network theory, an adjacency matrix is a 
square n ×	n matrix used to illustrate the state of connection in an entire network. It is 
the key element for network topological analysis and generating it is the initial step in 
any further investigating the network characteristics. 
 
5.2.2 Generating a weighted Network and weighted adjacency matrix 
5.2.2.1 Ridership data as weights for links 
The ridership data of the Washington D.C. Metro stations can be found on 
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA, 2016) archives. Figure 
5.2 shows the ridership distribution of a total of 91 stations comprising the 
Washington D.C. Metrorail. It is found that 44% of stations have less than 5,000 
passengers on average each day and 36% of stations have between approximately 
5,000 to 10,000 passengers on a daily basis. There are few stations that have a 
relatively large number of passengers, which is shown in Table 5.1. The data 







Figure 5.2. Distribution of station ridership in the Washington D.C. Metro. 
 
Table 5.1 Stations that have large passenger volume in the metrorail network 
Rank 
order 





1 Union Station 10 29371 2 
2 Gallery Place 12 25537   4 
3 Farragut North 14 24597 2 
4 Metro Center 13 24330 4 
5 L' Enfant Plaza 38 19343 5 
6 Dupont Circle 15 18653 2 
 
Referring to the number of passengers for each station, Fig. 3.4, which is a 
topological graph of Washington D.C. Metro, is modified to Fig. 5.3, in which node 



























Figure 5.3. Topological graph of Washington D.C. Metro network (The node sizes 
reflect the number of passengers flowing in each station). 
 
5.2.2.1 Weighted adjacency matrix 
To generate a weighted metro network, ridership data provide the dominant basis for 
computing the weight factors that define the dynamic nature of the network. 
Collecting ridership data for each link is not a practical task in the real world and the 





particular station must travel to one of its neighboring stations or exit the metro 
system. The current paper relies on following assumptions for computing the weight 
factors: 
 
1. The ridership for each link is related to the number of passengers at two end 
stations of the corresponding link assuming the system is a closed system; 
2. The number of passengers traveling from node i to node j frequently differs 
from the passengers traveling in the reverse direction of the link; 
3. The network is undirected. It should be noted that directed networks stand for 
networks including a set of links with arrows indicating the direction of those 
links. Undirected networks are free of this characteristic and, therefore, their 
analyses are simpler; 
4. Attractiveness of link is based on the density of passengers on the stations 
connected by associated links, and thus, it covers the case of a heavily used 
line; 
5. The data used are based on the average ridership on a daily basis; 
6. Different times of a day could attract different passenger density. However, 
the model proposed herein, concentrates on a general case considering the 
average number of daily passengers. Since the number of passengers might be 
different on different times of a day, for more realistic computational work, it 







Thus, to ease the evaluation, it is reasonable to assume the ridership on each link is 
proportional to the average of the sum of passengers in both directions on the link, 
i.e., i → j, and j → i. The more the passengers at the two neighboring stations, the 
larger the ridership on the link connecting the two stations. The equations for 
calculating ridership for each link can be expressed as: 
 
 R (i, j) = E
[
	(R i→j + R j→i) (5.1) 
 
 R (i, j) = 12 (Pi 
Md
∑Pneighboring nodes to node i
 + Pj PR∑Pneighboring nodes to node j) (5.2) 
 
where, R (i, j) signifies the ridership per day on a link between two neighboring nodes 
i and j in the undirected network; Pi and Pj represent number of passengers at station i 
and station j, respectively. The passengers that flow from node i to node j, i.e., R i→j, 
is calculated as the ratio of multiplication of the number of passengers at station i by 
the number of passengers at station j to the sum of passengers at all neighboring 
stations to station i. Neighboring nodes mean the nodes that are directly connected to 
one specific node. The equivalent calculation is relevant for the ridership in the 
reverse direction, i.e., R j→i . It just needs modification of the denominator to 
passengers at all stations neighboring to station j.  
 
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the logic behind the calculation of R i→j and R j→j . The 





ridership between any two neighboring stations, which is needed for this model, can 
be evaluated with respect to the total passengers of the initial station who would 
travel to all of its neighboring stations. For example, in Fig. 5.4, R i→j and R j→j are 
evaluated by Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4). 
 








where Pm, Pn, Pl and Pk are the number of passengers at stations m,n,l and k 
respectively. The neighboring stations of station i are stations j, m and n; the 












The weight wij assigned to each link could be achieved by normalizing the ridership at 
each link calculated as the ratio of R (i, j) to the ridership of the link that carries the 




 Max R(t, s)
 (5.5) 
 
where stations t and s are two neighboring stations belonging to the metro network 
located at two ends of a link that carry the maximum ridership. 
 
The ridership for each link is calculated based on Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4), which 
demonstrate the number of passengers at each link R (i, j) could be calculated as the 
average number of passengers who travel from node i to node j, and from node j to 
node i,  i.e., R i→j, and R j→i. Also, the ridership in each direction could be estimated as 
the ratio of multiplication of the number of passengers at station i by the number of 
passengers at station j to the sum of passengers at all neighboring stations to station i. 
The weight wij assigned to each link, therefore is achieved and normalized using Eq. 
(5.5). 
 
Based on the above calculations the weighted network is generated. Figure 5.5 
demonstrates the normalized link ridership weight distribution for the Washington 







Figure 5.5. Distribution of link ridership weight for the Washington D.C. Metro. 
 
Determining the weight on each link could lead to creating a weighted adjacency 
matrix. The elements of a weighted network adjacency matrix in the proposed 
methodology include either the weights in the case of direct link between two 
neighboring nodes or zero otherwise as follows: 
 
 aij=g
    	
wij        Weight of connection link from nodes i and j
0     When there is no direct link between node i and j
 (5.6) 
 
5.2.3 Assessing efficiency, robustness, and vulnerability 
The network efficiency or global network efficiency of a metrorail network is a 
measure of how efficiently stations i and j connect within the network. The global 
efficiency of an unweighted network is quantified as Eq. (3.15). While, the global 






























where n is the number of stations and dij is the geodesic path or shortest path. In 
addition, Wij alone is the sum of all wij on each geodesic path. The method used in 
this paper for evaluating network efficiency satisfies the following assumptions: (1) 
Passengers typically tend to use the geodesic path dij between their origin station and 
their destinations. (2) The geodesic path in this paper is the minimum number of links 
between any pair of nodes. Other dimensions that may affect the geodesic path 
assessment, such as link lengths and travel time are not considered herein. Thus, the 
path length which is the number of links in a specific path is the same for a weighted 
network and an unweighted network in this study. (3) The elements of a weighted 
network adjacency matrix in the proposed methodology are based on Eq. (5.6). (4) 
Although, each link in the network is assigned the weight that reflects its ridership, 
for analyzing the global network efficiency, weighted-links on the geodesic path 
between each pair of nodes have been taken into account.  
 
In references to the assumptions outlined above, the n ×	n unweighted adjacency 
matrix is used in Floyd algorithm (Floyd 1962) to measure the geodesic path between 
any stations i and j in the network. Also, the n ×	n weighted adjacency matrix is used 
to incorporate in the calculation of global efficiency. Therefore, global network 





each geodesic path to the corresponding geodesic path for all possible pair of nodes in 
the network could be achieved. 
 
As previously stated, network efficiency is usually defined as an indicator to quantify 
the network connectivity. The robustness of a metro network lies in its ability to resist 
and maintain residual network connectivity after a disruptive event. Accordingly, EGi 
is the residual network connectivity and could be considered as the network 
robustness. Thus, the network robustness EGi	is the network efficiency after removal 










where n' is the number of nodes after node removals in the network. In the case of 
merely link removals, the number of nodes remain unchanged. The new geodesic path 
is d'ij and is calculated through a revised adjacency matrix which captures changes in 
the network’s pattern of connection. Also, W'ij is the sum of all wij on each new 
geodesic path d'ij.  
 
Evaluating the weighted network vulnerability relates to the changes on the weighted 











 V=Max Vi                   (5.9b) 
 
where Vi is the network vulnerability after disruption, EGW is the initial network 
efficiency of a network prior to any disruption in the network and EGW	i is the post 
network efficiency after removal of nodes or links in a metro network. Vulnerability 
assessment of a weighted metrorail herein also includes two cases: 
 
Case I: One-at-a-time node removal due to a disruptive event; and 
Case II: One-at-a-time link removal due to a disruptive event. 
 
The factual example of such events could happen during natural hazards such as 
flooding. For instance, Superstorm Sandy (2012) knocked out several New York City 
subway links and stations due to flooding (FEMA 2013).  
 
These two cases are described in the subsequent subsections in a structured manner. 
 
5.2.3.1 Vulnerability assessment of the weighted network with node failures 
When a station fails in a weighted metro network, passengers using that station may 
decide to pick other transportation modes. In this dissertation, an assumption is made 
that passengers choose other alternate transportation options excluding the metro 
systems, such as busses, for the purpose of illustration. Other variants to assumptions 





assumption offers a basis to reduce analytical and computational difficulties by not 
including the option within the metrorail network; however, this assumption could be 
removed in future works by linking networks of several transportation modes 
including the metrorail network. On this basis, all links on the entire network may 
also be affected by having their weights increased or decreased. Thus, the method of 
node removal for vulnerability assessment requires regenerating both the adjacency 
matrix and the weighted adjacency matrix. The size of the new adjacency matrix is 
(n-1) ×	(n-1). By using the new adjacency matrix in a modified Floyd algorithm 
(Floyd, 1962), all new geodesic paths between any pair of nodes can be derived. Also, 
the new (n-1) ×	(n-1) weighted adjacency matrix is used in Eq. (5.8) for the purpose 
of calculating the post global network efficiency after a disruptive event. Then, using 
Eqs. (5.9a) and (5.9b) the vulnerability of a weighted metro network is assessed. 
Table 5.2 lists the ten most vulnerable stations in the Washington D.C. Metro 







Table 5.2 The ten most vulnerable stations in the weighted Washington D.C. Metro network. 
Rank 
order 








1 Gallery Place Red-Yellow-Green 12 25537   4 39.19 
2 Metro Center Red-Orange-Silver-Blue 13 24330 4 34.32 
3 Farragut North Red 14 24597 2 34.26 
4 Dupont Circle Red 15 18653 2 31.84 
5 Woodley Park Red 16 5861 2 28.92 
6 L' Enfant Plaza Green-Orange-Silver-Blue-Yellow 38 19343 5 28.70 
7 Cleveland Park Red 17 3961 2 25.96 
8 Van Ness Red 18 6158 2 23.16 
9 Rosslyn Orange-Silver-Blue 73 13666 3 21.13 














As demonstrated in Table 5.2, the most vulnerable station in the weighted 
Washington D.C. Metrorail is the Gallery Place station, which carries a relatively 
large number of passengers. According to Eq. (5.8) the initial global network 
efficiency for the weighted network is 0.1354. Removing Gallery Place reduces 
network global efficiency by 39.19%, which is considerable. The global network 
efficiency after the Gallery Place station removal would be 0.0823 and it is reduced 
by 0.0531, which is 39.19% of the value of the initial global network efficiency. 
Although fewer than half of the most vulnerable stations carry a large number of 
passengers and are heavily used by commuters, that is not always the case. There are 
some stations that carry a small number of passengers and are still considered among 
the most vulnerable stations like the Cleveland Park station. In counterpart, the Union 
Station, which carries the largest number of passengers, is not ranked among the most 
vulnerable stations. However, transfer stations that have large node degrees located in 
the central part of the city play a critical role and they are ranked among the most 
vulnerable stations in the metrorail network. Results show stations located on the 
northwest part of the Red Line are also among the most vulnerable stations. There is a 
strong likelihood of correlation between the most vulnerable stations and their 
locations in the network. Thus, it could be concluded that location plays a more 
significant role in vulnerability assessment rather than the number of passengers. 
Identifying vulnerable stations could raise the attention of planners and engineers for 
safety enhancement. Nevertheless, some stations, such as the Union Station, are not 





Therefore, their safety enhancement and resilience investment should also receive 
appropriate consideration.  
 
5.2.3.2 Vulnerability assessment of the weighted network with link failures 
The vulnerability assessment with link removal follows almost a similar procedure to 
the vulnerability analysis with node removal to examine the contribution of each link 
on the network global efficiency. The differences between node and link removal 
vulnerability assessment are associated with two important considerations: 
 
● The size of the adjacency matrix does not change in the link removal case. 
When a link fails in the network, its two end stations are disconnected and 
there is no direct connection between those stations. Thus, the corresponding 
element in the adjacency matrix is substituted with infinity instead of one. 
● The size of the weighted adjacency matrix in the link removal case remains 
the same. However, the weight of the failed link is set to zero.  
 
The link vulnerability assessment of the Washington D.C. Metro network is similar to 
the node vulnerability analysis. Yet, the size of unweighted and weighted adjacency 
matrices remain as 91 ×	91 and the entity for the failed link in the network. 
 
The global efficiency after link removal is evaluated for all links on the network. 
Table 5.3 demonstrates the ten most critical links of the Washington D.C. Metro 





Table 5.3 The ten most critical links in the Washington D.C Metro network 
Rank 
order 
Link Station names at two ends of each 
link 
Color-coded lines Robustness Vulnerability   
Magnitude (%) 
1 (13,14) (Metro center, Farragut North) Red 0.0866 36.04 
2 (14,15) (Farragut North, Dupont Circle) Red 0.0900 33.57 
3 (15,16) (Dupont Circle, Woodley Park) Red 0.0942 30.44 
4 (16,17) (Woodley Park, Cleveland Park) Red 0.0983 27.44 
5 (17,18) (Cleveland Park, Van Ness) Red 0.1019 24.74 
6 (18,19) (Van Ness, Tenley Town) Red 0.1054 22.20 
7 (73,74) (Rosslyn, Court House) Orange-Silver 0.1060 21.77 
8 (66,67) (Capital South, Federal Center SW) Blue-Orange-Silver 0.1065 21.39 
9 (74,75) (Court House, Clarendon) Orange-Silver 0.1084 19.98 












5.2.4 Comparing network vulnerability using weighted and unweighted metrics 
 
To assess the benefit of using a weighted network rather than an unweighted one, this 
section compares the robustness and vulnerability measurements of weighted and 
unweighted networks. In Chapter 4 the global efficiency, robustness, and 
vulnerability of unweighted Washington D.C. Metro network’s components are 
calculated. Table 5.4 and 5.5 provide the comparison among critical nodes and links 





Table 5.4 Comparison between the most critical nodes in the unweighted and weighted Washington D.C Metro networks 
Unweighted network Weighted network 








L' Enfant Plaza (38) 0.1005 29.78 Gallery Place (12) 0.0824 39.19 
Gallery Place (12) 0.1096 23.42 Metro Center (13) 0.0890 34.32 
Metro Center (13) 0.1182 17.43 Farragut North (14) 0.0891 34.26 
Federal Center SW (67) 0.1192 16.70 Dupont Circle (15) 0.0923 31.84 
Pentagon (48) 0.1199 16.22 Woodley Park (16) 0.0963 28.92 
Rosslyn (73) 0.1212 15.3 L' Enfant Plaza (38) 0.0966 28.70 
Capital South (66) 0.1215 15.09 Cleveland Park (17) 0.1003 25.96 
Farragut North (14) 0.1228 14.23 Van Ness (18) 0.1041 23.16 
Eastern Market (65) 0.1234 13.79 Rosslyn (73) 0.1068 21.13 






Table 5.4 shows how link strengths, presented by their weights, may affect changing 
the order of components criticality. Almost half of critical stations are mutual in the 
two cases of unweighted and weighted networks. However, they have different orders 
and their robustness and vulnerability are considerably different. The Robustness 
measurements are lower in the weighted network and the vulnerability magnitudes 
are higher. Thus, a weighted network shows heightened sensitivity to a disruptive 
event and could have impact on planning and decision making for those critical 
components. 
 
The results of critical links in unweighted and weighted networks are significantly 
different. A weighted network shows heightened criticality and illustrates the 





Table 5.5 Comparison between the most critical links in the unweighted and weighted Washington D.C Metro networks 
Unweighted network Weighted network 
Station names and numbers 
at two ends of each link 
Robustness Vulnerability 
Magnitude (%) 
Station names and numbers at 
two ends of each link 
Robustness Vulnerability 
Magnitude (%) 
(Metro center, Federal 
Triangle) (13,69) 





0.1235 14.42 (Farragut North, Dupont 
Circle) (14,15) 
0.0900 33.57 
(L' Enfant Plaza, 
Smithsonian) (38,68) 
0.1243 13.14 (Dupont Circle, Woodley 
Park) (15,16) 
0.0942 30.44 
(Rosslyn, Court House) 
(73,74) 
0.1248 12.78 (Woodley Park, Cleveland 
Park) (16,17) 
0.0983 27.44 
(L' Enfant plaza, Federal 
Center SW) (38,67) 








Table 5.5 , Continued 
Unweighted network Weighted network 
Station names and numbers 
at two ends of each link 
Robustness Vulnerability 
Magnitude (%) 
Station names and numbers at 
two ends of each link 
Robustness Vulnerability 
Magnitude (%) 
(Metro Center, Farragut 
North) (13,14) 
0.1264 11.71 (Van Ness, Tenley Town) 
(18,19) 
0.1054 22.20 
(Pentagon, Pentagon City) 
(48,49) 
0.1266 11.57 (Rosslyn, Court 
House)(73,74) 
0.1060 21.77 
(Court House, Clarendon) 
(74,75) 
0.1267 11.50 (Capital South, Federal Center 
SW) (66,67) 
0.1065 21.39 
(Stadium Armory, Potomac 
Ave) (63,64) 













5.3 Conclusions and Contributions 
Chapter 5 analyzes failure events resulting in node or link removal in weighted urban 
rail transit networks and assesses the network attributes such as efficiency, 
robustness, and vulnerability. Robustness and vulnerability assessment is a necessary 
means to analyze risk and resilience, and to identify potential threats to such a 
network. The origins of these threats may come from within or outside of the network 
and could pose risks to the network performance. To assess the network performance 
along other attributes, a weighted network model based on the CNT method is 
presented. A weighted matrix along with an adjacency matrix are used to evaluate the 
network global efficiency, i.e., prior to and post failure. The variation in global 
efficiency before and after disruption is the basis of vulnerability assessment. The 
identified vulnerable components of a weighted network are more reasonable and 
realistic than they would be without considering weight. 
 
In order to conduct such an assessment, the methodology proposed in this chapter has 
the following novel approaches, which could advance this area of research: 
 
● A practical model is proposed to calculate link ridership based on the 
passenger volume of stations. The model presented here is different from 
typical origin-destination models. It directly estimates the number of 
passengers who travel on each link. Network links intrinsically may carry 
different weights. Weights assigned to the network links in this dissertation 





could be applied to estimate the weight strengths on the network links without 
changing the adjacency matrix and without posing higher computational 
burden.  
● The topological connectivity for an unweighted network is analyzed in order 
to achieve a geodesic path between any two stations and also combined with 
the use of ridership data to construct a weighted network−in terms of the 
summation of link ridership weights on each geodesic path− to incorporate 
them into the global network efficiency equation.  
● A global network efficiency expression is altered by adding a weight factor 
considering ridership for the metrorail network. Thus, the network global 
efficiency herein is computed based on the geodesic path between any pair of 
nodes and the sum of weights assigned to links of corresponding geodesic 
paths for all possible pairs of nodes.  
 
The presented methodology addresses shortcomings in previous works as provided in 
the introduction that incorporated only the weighted adjacency matrix in their 
algorithm to calculate the geodesic paths and other metrorail network characteristics. 
While those models could work for the network that includes positive weights, it 
would fail to consider negative weights. Typically, the algorithms available for 
calculating topological network characteristics fail to integrate matrices with negative 
entities in calculating geodesic paths. Furthermore, including the weighted adjacency 
matrix as a direct input for calculating the geodesic path may not lead to achieving 





modified definition of network efficiency herein could consider the negative weights 
in generic cases. Negative weights may not occur in the case of metro networks as 
provided in the case study; however, in general, negative values are possible. For 
example, in social studies of acquaintance networks when considering animosity 
among individuals, negative weight values are possible and their use is appropriate 
(Newman 2004). 
 
Methods proposed in this chapter are not limited to the specific domain, e.g., 
metrorail networks, and could be generalized for any domain that has network 
paradigms. However, for the purpose of illustrating methodology in a structured 
manner, it is rendered through a metrorail network domain. Its application for a 
metrorail network can reflect not only connectivity in an applied way but also 
ridership, which are the two critical aspects of the network. 
 
Network vulnerability for the case study of choice, Washington D.C. Metro, was 
assessed by considering two circumstances, i.e., the metro network subjected to node 
removal and link removal. Both cases demonstrate that the most critical components 
of the Washington D.C. Metro belong to the central part of the city as well as the 
northwest section of the Red Line. The results also demonstrate that some stations 
and links in the metrorail that carry a larger number of passengers compared to other 
stations and links ranked among the most vulnerable components of the metrorail. 
However, it is not a typical paradigm. More specifically, on the basis of Washington 





Silver Line in the central part of the city with moderate passenger flow would 
negatively impact the total metrorail performance rather than removing a link on the 
single but heavily traveled Red Line; or removal of a station on the combined Green-
Red-Yellow Line located in the central part of the city would drastically decrease 
vulnerability of the metro rather than the Union Station located on the Red Line with 
larger volume of passengers. Hence, considering only the weight factor in obtaining 
critical components is insufficient. Node degree and the positions of stations or links 
determine the contributions of components to the whole network's connectivity, have 
also their own impacts. The rankings according to criticality of stations and links is a 
combination result of the link position, station position, and the ridership of the 
network. Therefore, in the vulnerability assessment, location is as important as 
ridership and sometimes more influential. It is proposed that during the planning, 
construction, and operation of the metrorail transit network, great attention should be 
paid to the management and protection of these vulnerable positions. Accordingly, in 
future development, enhancement through risk reduction should be focused on the 
Red Line located in the northwest of the city as well as segments located in the 
central part of the city.  
 
Identifying the most vulnerable stations, tunnels, bridges, above-grounds and any 
other segments of a metro network provides insights to enhance metrorail safety, 
reduce the susceptibility of the vulnerable components, improve the resilience of the 
whole metro network and, ultimately, results in economic savings. Also, the results 





and monitor vulnerable elements, which are significant for global network 































Chapter 6: Resilience-Based Strategies for Topology 
Enhancement and Recovery of Metrorail Transit Networks* 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This dissertation provides a structured methodology to assess a metro network’s 
vulnerability and develops a resilience metric by utilizing the Washington D.C. 
Metro as a case study. Chapter 5, in particular, offers strategies for enhancing its 
resilience prior to any network failure as a planning activity or post failure as a 
recovery activity. On this basis, the contribution/novelty of this chapter could be 
expressed as follows: 
 
● Improving the resilience of the network prior to failure through topology 
enhancement such as adding a loop line to the network and using the results 
as a basis for justifying capital improvement projects. 
● Assessing the post failure recovery strategy based on minimizing 
performance loss in the network and identifying the best recovery sequences 
                                               
* Paper published or submitted 
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not only in the event of multiple station failures, but also in the event of 
multiple link failures.  
● Providing a comprehensive cost-benefit model, proposing a cost breakdown 
hierarchy in the instance of a metro disruptive event and considering cost 
analysis as a complimentary work for post-recovery strategy. 
 
6.2 A Proposed Methodology for Increasing Resilience of Metro Transit Network 
through topology enhancements and recovery strategies. 
The strategies offered in this chapter to enhance resilience before failure is through 
network topology enhancement such as adding a loop line in the network. Adding a 
loop line creates redundancy for critical components of the metro and leads to 
significantly reducing the vulnerability of the network. However, a post failure state 
shifts the attention to employing effective recovery strategies based on minimizing 
performance loss. An effective recovery strategy is defined by identifying the 
recovery sequence of nodes or links that maximizes the resilience while taking into 
consideration the minimization of the recovery cost. Effective post-failure recovery 
strategies are defined by recovery sequences and recovery costs. The methodology 
herein is shown in Fig. 6.1 and consists of the following steps: 
 
1. Defining a system as a network by its nodes, links and a pattern of connectivity; 
2. Analyzing the network topology and computing the network characteristic 
indicators, i.e., node degree, average node degree, adjacency matrix and 





3. Assessing the network efficiency, which is the basis of measuring its vulnerability; 
4. Evaluating the resilience metric as an index for the metro system; 
5. Enhancing the topology of the network by individually examining several alternate 
loop lines as capital improvements to the network through creating redundancy to 
vulnerable components and comparing the states before and after adding a loop; 
and 
6. Identifying effective recovery strategies on the basis of minimizing the 








Figure 5.1. A proposed methodology for increasing resilience of metro transit 
network through topology enhancements and recovery strategies. 
6.2.1 Enhancing metro topology by capital improvement 
 
Topology enhancements offer a basis to create redundancy for vulnerable components 
of a network by capital improvement that may include loop lines through the network 
core. This section examines vulnerability changes of critical components after added 
loop lines and compares network efficiencies for several proposed loop lines. These 
loop lines are expected to not only decrease the network vulnerability but also allow 
passengers alternate tracks in cases of maintenance or emergency. They could 
increase the network connectivity by decreasing the metro characteristic path length. 
Additionally, when a transfer station fails in the network, a loop line offers alternate 
connection for the primary metro lines. Accordingly, this section demonstrates 
concepts introduced using the Washington D.C. Metro’s critical components by 
adding three hypothetical loop line options. For each loop line, a new metro map was 
generated. Existing stations were examined with respect to their passenger flow and 
proximity to major job centers of the city to determine which stations are the proper 
location for a loop line to overlay through them in a way that enhance redundancy for 
critical components of the network. The global network efficiency and network 
vulnerability were recalculated. Comparisons were made between the original 
network and each network with an added loop line. The analytical model is laid out in 






Figures 6.2a-6.2c show three metro maps of Washington D.C. each with a 












The first loop line in Fig. 6.2a connects existing metro lines together and passes 
through existing stations 10, 35, 14, 71, 72, 73, 47, 48, 39, 40 and 66. It increased the 
number of physical metro links by 12 regardless of how lines sharing the same tracks 
are taken into account. However, if they are considered, they are treated as a single 
link and the number of total links added to the network is equal to 6. The second loop 
line in Fig. 6.2b is a modified version of the first loop line by connecting stations 10, 
35, 14, 71, 72, 73, 47, 48, 38, 67, and 66. It added 4 new separate links into the 
network that are not sharing the same tracks with other lines and mostly passes 
through exciting tunnel lines for the purpose of cost effectiveness. The stations above 
are chosen because they are in the core of the city around the most vulnerable 
components of the network and, referring to Fig. 6.3, they have significant passenger 
flow. For example, station 10 is Union station and according to Washington 
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA 2016), it carries 29371 passengers on 
a daily basis, which is a relatively large number. Its location is strategically important 
in the downtown area, close to historical places, a block from the U.S. Capitol, and 
neighboring many leisure destinations in the city. Also, as a major train station and 
transportation hub, it is one of the most important stations that loop lines 1 and 2 pass 
through. The major difference between the first and second loop lines is the link 
between station 48 and 49, which would be an actual bridge built over the Potomac 
River and it may induce substantial construction costs to the network. The third loop 
line , i.e., loop line 3, passes through stations 6, 7, 32, 18,19,78, 53,41, 63 and inserts 
six additional links to the original network as shown in Fig. 6c. Loop line 3 is a 





different quadrants of the city together. The stations for loop line 3 are chosen based 
on the passenger flow, location and access to important city’s assets. For example, 
station 41 is Amtrak’s Washington D.C. Train station in addition to the metro station. 
Loop line 3 is relatively lengthy and has the capacity to add some new stations into it. 
This paper does not designate additional stations on the loop lines for the purpose of 
reducing analytical difficulties. Adding such stations could be an option and may be 
investigated in future studies.  
 
For the three loop lines, adjacency matrices were regenerated. The size of the 
adjacency matrix remains the same as the original adjacency matrix while its entries 
change. By using the new adjacency matrices in the modified Floyd algorithm (1962), 
all new geodesic paths between any pair of nodes were derived. Using Table 3.3 
information and Eq. (3.15), characteristic path length and global network efficiency 
for each network were calculated, respectively, which are shown in Table 6.1. 
Accordingly, global network efficiency for all three loop lines is increased and the 
greatest measure is associated with metro network embracing loop line 3, which has 
the shortest characteristic path length. The global efficiency in the original network is 
0.1432 while in the network with loop line 3 is 0.1918, with an increase of 33.9 %. 
Characteristic path length in the network with loop line 3 significantly drops from 
11.50 to 6.94. Nevertheless, the efficiency changes in the metro with loop lines 1 and 
2 are not as great as the one with loop line 3, and though they are less than ten 
percent, they still play important roles in the metro connectivity. Figures 6.3a-6.3b 





connectivity after failure of node 38, i.e., L' Enfant plaza. In Fig. 6.3a, node 38 is 
failed and east/south east parts of the metro are disconnected from the rest. Figure 
6.3b shows that while node 38 is in a failed state, loop line 1 connects the four 
quadrants of the city.  
 
Table 6.1 The network efficiency for the original network and for  the network with 
each loop added 
Rank order with 
respect to EG 






1 Original network 0.1432 11.50 
2 Network with loop line 1 0.1554 10.11 
3 Network with loop line 2 0.1514 10.37 
4 Network with loop line 3 0.1918 6.94 
 
 
Figure 6.3. Comparison between metro connectivity after failure of node 38: (a) 





Network efficiency is essential for vulnerability evaluation for both cases of one-at-a-
time node and link failures using Eqs. (4.1a) and (4.1b). Table. 6.2 shows the 
vulnerability assessment results for the different networks in the case of node failures. 
Figure 6.4 display the vulnerability profile comparison of those stations.  
 
Table 6.3 and Fig. 6.5 show the result in the case of link failures. The links are shown 
with numbers at their two ends. Some of them are from a single line, however, most 





Table 6.2 Vulnerability of the ten most critical stations in the Washington D.C. Metro network for different network topologies 
   Vulnerability Magnitude (%) 
Rank order 
with respect to V 







loop line 1 
Network with 
loop line 2 
Network with 
loop line 3 
1 L' Enfant plaza  38 29.78 5.17 16.3 6.43 
2 Gallery Place 12 23.42 3.75 3.87 4.71 
3 Metro Center 13 17.43 3.98 4.09 4.34 
4 Federal Center SW 67 16.70 3.24 4.75 2.88 
5 Pentagon 48 16.22 14.78 14.57 4.01 
6 Rosslyn 73 15.30 13.13 15.28 3.26 
7 Capital South 66 15.09 19.23 17.82 2.54 
8 Farragut North 14 14.23 17.07 17.39 2.85 
9 Eastern Market 65 13.79 15.39 15.31 2.74 














Table 6.3 Vulnerability of the ten most critical links in the Washington D.C Metro network for different network topologies 
   Vulnerability Magnitude (%) 
Rank order  with 
respect to V 
Link Color-coded lines Original  
network 
Network with 
loop line 1 
Network with 
loop line 2 
Network with 
loop line 3 
1 (13,69) Blue-Orange-Silver 16.07 0.74 0.70 0.52 
2 (68,69) Blue-Orange-Silver 14.42 0.52 0.46 0.45 
3 (38,68) Blue-Orange-Silver 13.14 0.96 0.90 0.93 
4 (73,74) Orange-Silver 12.78 12.48 12.61 1.14 
5 (38,67) Blue-Orange-Silver 12.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 (13,14) Red 11.71 0.67 0.68 0.00 
7 (48, 49) Blue-Yellow 11.57 10.70 10.73 1.05 
8 (74,75) Orange-Silver 11.50 11.19 11.32 1.11 
9 (63,64) Blue-Orange-Silver 11.14 11.95 11.95 0.80 















With merely focusing on the vulnerability assessment, results demonstrate that 
inserting an appropriate loop line could significantly decrease the vulnerability of 
critical network components and enhance the network connectivity. For instance, loop 
line 1 notably decreases the vulnerability of the L' Enfant Plaza station from 29.78% 
to 5.17%. Loop line 3 reduces the vulnerability of aforementioned station to 6.43%. 
Although this change is not significant in the case of adding loop line 2, it is still 
meaningful. While loop lines 1 and 2 decrease the vulnerability of most critical 
stations, they expectedly have a slight impact on the vulnerability rise of stations, 
Capitol South, i.e., 66, Farragut North, i.e., 14, and Eastern Market, i.e., 65. After 
adding loop lines 1 and 2, stations 66 and 14 convert to transfer stations and station 
65 would be connected to new transfer station, i.e., Capitol South. Transfer stations 
and stations that are connected to them usually ranked among most critical network 
components. Loop lines 1 and 2 reduce the vulnerability of all links, however, 
changes range from 15.96% to almost zero, noting that some cases have insignificant 
negative impacts. Loop line 3 considerably drops the vulnerability of all the 10 most 
critical stations in the network. Also, it induces an enormous positive impact on the 
vulnerability of most critical links.  
 
All loop lines improve the most critical components of the network, affect the other 
network components and change their vulnerability ranking. If all components are 
considered with vulnerabilities assessed and still the whole network vulnerability is 





vulnerabilities and their associated most vulnerable stations for the original metro 
network and networks with added loop lines.  
 
Table 6.4 Vulnerability summary for all alternative Washington D.C Metro network 




Network with different 
topology 







1 Original network L' Enfant plaza 38 29.78 
2 Network with loop line 1 Capital South 66 19.23 
3 Network with loop line 2 Capital South 66 17.82 
4 Network with loop line 3 Stadium-Armory 63 19.99 
 
This chapter investigates three hypothetical loop lines for the purpose of illustration. 
Obviously, many other loop lines could be explored. The number of loop lines, 
adding or removing stations within them, changing the location of the loop lines, 
weighing construction cost and many other factors could change the preferences. In 
fact, deciding on the proper alternative is a typical trade-off problem. Identifying the 
optimum alternate loop line(s) requires methods of optimization and cost-benefit 







6.2.2 Identifying effective recovery sequence  
 
Following a failure, adopting appropriate recovery strategy could play an important 
role in the network resilience restoration. The best recovery strategy depends not only 
on the recovery sequence, but also the recovery cost. Parameters like practicality, 
legal requirements, risk management, risk informed decision, etc., could impact the 
sequence of recovery selected. This paper suggests steps needed to identify an 
appropriate recovery sequence based on the key points and metrics related to 
resilience restoration and recovery cost. 
 
6.2.1.1. Recovery sequence preferences with respect to resilience restoration 
Henry and Ramiz-Marquez (2012) discussed the importance of a sequential recovery 
strategy in the events that connectivity of the network need to be restored to the initial 
state. In the event of a transfer station failure or failure in multi-links, the sequential 
recover strategy is most effective. Assuming that only one component of a network 
can be repaired at a time, it is important to capture which sequential recovery 
provides the highest resilience restoration of the metro network. Thus, the network 
resilience during restoration for the following three cases using the Washington D.C. 
Metro is evaluated: 
 






● Identifying the appropriate recovery sequence for multiple disrupted metro 
stations (i.e., the disruption of multiple stations with same node degree and 
the failure of multiple stations with a different node degree); and 
● Identifying the appropriate recovery sequence for multiple disrupted metro 
links. 
 
Each of these cases are expanded upon in the rest of this section assuming a 
disruptive event leads to full failure in the affected metro network station and links. 
Also, other transportation modes, such as busses, are not considered as elimination of 
connectivity interruption in such cases of disruptions. 
 
In the first case, a single metro station is disrupted. With reference to Table 4.1, the 
most vulnerable station of the Washington D.C. Metro, which plays a significant role 
in the metro connectivity, is the L' Enfant Plaza station. It is shown by node 38 in the 
map and the node degree of this station is five, the highest node degree in the 
network. As for the node 38 shown in Fig. 6.6, in total, three lines, i.e., line 1, 2 and 3 
connect to node 38; therefore, the possible recovery sequences to fully recover the 
three lines through the station are equal to the permutation of 3, i.e., P (3,3) =3! = 6, 
and each recovery sequence has a corresponding resilience index. In general, the 
number of possible recovery sequences for m lines at a station is equal to permutation 
of m in P(m,m). The permutations of possible recovery sequences are denoted m1-





n) denotes the number assigned to each line. Resilience index is calculated using Eq. 
(4.3) assuming that the recovery time is constant for all six choices. Effectively, Eq. 
(4.3) shows the relation between Re, EG and the recovery time. Hence, recovery 
profile in terms of efficiency restoration over time are produced to calculate resilience 
index. In Table 6.5, the resilience index is calculated for all six possible sequences 
recovery of L' Enfant Plaza station.  
 
 












Table 6.5 Resilience (Re) for six possible recovery sequences of L' Enfant plaza 
station 
Rank order with 
respect to Re 
Recovery 
sequence 
Re Rank order with 




1 2-3-1 0.865 4 2-1-3 0.831 
2 3-2-1 0.858 5 1-3-2 0.815 
3 3-1-2 0.835 6 1-2-3 0.796 
 
Initial network efficiency is 0.1432 and the network connectivity after the L' Enfant 
Plaza station failure is 0.1005. The sequence desired is with the maximum value of 
resilience index. Table 6.5 reveals the largest Re value is 0.865 corresponding to 
recovery sequence 2-3-1. Verifying that if L' Enfant Plaza station is disrupted, the 
first metro line to be recovered should be 2, followed by 3, and finally 1 to provide 
the highest resilience restoration. Conversely, the smallest Re value from the table is 
0.796 for the recovery sequence 1-2-3. The efficiency-time curves for sequence 2-3-1 
with maximum Re and sequence 1-2-3 with minimum Re are shown in Fig. 6.7-a.  
 
The proposed steps above can be used for the other two cases of multi-station and 
multi-link removal. The multi-station case includes two sub-cases where the stations 
either: 
 





● Have identical node degrees. 
For sub-case one, stations L' Enfant Plaza (node 38) with node degree of 5 and Fort 
Totten (node 6) with node degree of 4 and Pentagon station (node 48) with node 
degree of 3 are selected to exemplify the multi-station disruption with different node 
degrees. Here also there are six permutations for the recover sequences; Table 5.6 
shows Re values corresponding to the six possible recovery sequences in addition to 
Fig. 6.7-b, which shows the efficiency-time recovery curves for best and worst 
recovery sequences. For sub-case two, three stations, Fort Totten (node 6), Gallery 
Place (node 12), and Metro Center (Node 13), all with identical node degrees of 4, 
are selected. Table 6.7 demonstrates all possible recovery sequences and their 
associated Re for sub-case two of multi stations removal with same node degree. 
Figure 6.7-c shows efficiency-time curves for the two extreme recovery sequences in 
terms of Re.  
 
Table 6.6 Resilience (Re) for six possible recovery sequences of multi stations 
disruption with different Ki 
Rank order with 
respect to Re 
Recovery 
sequence 
Re Rank order with 




1 38-48-6 0.824 4 6-38-48 0.747 
2 38-6-48 0.799 5 48-6-38 0.710 







Table 6.7 Resilience (Re) for six possible recovery sequences of multi stations 
disruption with same Ki 
Rank order with 
respect to Re 
Recovery 
sequence 
Re Rank order 




1 12-13-6 0.827 4 12-6-13 0.798 
2 13-6-12 0.819 5 6-12-13 0.767 
3 13-12-6 0.815 6 6-13-12 0.744 
 
The final case investigates the best recovery sequence of multiple disrupted links. In 
demonstrating this case, three links of (13,69), (13,14) and (14,15) are selected. Table 
6.8 demonstrates the resilience index measurements for six possible recovery 
sequences. Figure 6.7d also displays the efficiency-time curves for the recovery 








Table 6.8 Resilience (Re) for six possible recovery sequences of multiple links 
Rank order with 
respect to Re 
Recovery sequence Re Rank order with 
respect to Re 
Recovery sequence Re 
1 (13,14)-(14,15)-(13,69) 0.913 4 (13,69)-(13,14)-(14,15) 0.871 
2 (14,15)-(13,14)-(13,69) 0.908 5 (14,15)-(13,69)-(13,14) 0.866 








Several recovery stages are shown in all Figs. 6.7a-6.7 d, starting with stage 0, which 
represents the network in its pre-failure state with network efficiency calculated as 
0.1432. Total station failure is represented in stage 1 with a sharp reduction in 
network efficiency. Stages 2 and 3 represent the two intermediate steps of the 
recovery sequence and the final stage 4 represents a full recovery. In the event of a 
single node failure in the network where the node degree is greater than 2, the results 
indicate that the choice of a sequential recovery strategy is consequential and the best 
recovery strategy should be identified. In the case of multi-transfer stations 
disruption, the sequential recovery strategy has a significant effect on the resilience 
restoration; however, the resilience index did not change significantly when the 
authors examined the sequential recovery strategy for the multi-link disruption. 
Recovery cost, besides recovery sequence, is another key creation for decision maker 






Figure 6.7. Comparison of network efficiency under two different recovery sequences 
with maximum and minimum Re for disruption cases of: (a) One transfer station; (b) 
Multi stations with different Ki; (c)Multi stations with same Ki; (d) Multiple links. 
 
6.2.1.2. Recovery sequence preferences with respect to cost effectiveness 
The total cost associated with a disruptive event of a metro system includes the cost 
associated with the decrease in revenue due to income loss, and the cost associated 
with the risk to passengers and workers, i.e., life losses/injuries, in addition to 








cost represented by the decrease in revenue depends on the changes in volume of 
passengers using the metro line or station before and after their failure. The cost 
represented by life losses and injuries depend on the severity of the adverse event 
resulting in disruptive event; the assessment of property loss cost as a result of failure 
could be quantified in monetary terms using analytical model, historical data and 
expert judgment. The total cost of a disruptive event is defined as 
 
 Ctotal= CIncome loss+ CLife loss/injuries +CProperty loss (6.1) 
 
The cost of property loss CProperty loss is the cost of the implementation of repairs, and 
consists of direct costs, i.e., cost of repairing and replacing equipment, machinery 
damage, consumption of engineering materials, content and inventory damage and 
also salary for the workforce in addition to the cost of non-repairable damages (also 
termed indirect cost which is caused by social related factors and could be seen as a 
portion of cost of repair.) It can be represented as 
 
 CProperty loss = CRepair (6.2) 
 
Incorporating CRepair in Eq. (6.1) lead to Ctotal  as follows: 
 






Assumptions related to the repaired state as provided by Ayyub (2015) in terms of the 
restored state, such as as good as new, as good as old, etc. Following the model 
proposed by Henry and Ramirez-Marquez (2012), the recovery cost during the 
disruption CRecovery is sum of the income loss due to network failure, and the cost of 
repair.  
 
 CRecovery = CIncome loss+ CRepair (6.4) 
 
where CIncome loss typically is decreasing in revenue due to income loss of metrorail 
and metrobus tickets, other metro access payment, parking fees, retail incomes, 
diminished personnel productivity due the metro closing, damage to metro’s 
reputation, etc. 
 
Ridership on Washington D.C. Metro comprises approximately 92 percent of the total 
metro revenue (Washington D.C. Metro Fiscal Year 2018 Proposed Budget). 
Therefore, the income loss due to a decline in metro ridership is defined as: 
 
 CMetro ticket = ! VOLloss (6.5) 
 
where VOLloss is the total loss in passenger volume after a disruptive event, and ! is 
the average metro ticket price. The passenger volume, however, is expected to return 





(for "	$%	["', ")]). Therefore, it is the linear function of time (Zhang et al. 2017) and 




+ (VOLn−VOLd)(	") − "') (6.6) 
 
where "' is the time of station disablement and ") is the time of completion of 
recovery. Although the cost associated with passenger volume has a primary role in 
the income loss of a metro network, the other metro attributes, i.e., decrease in 
revenue due to metro bus passengers and parking fees, a decline in passengers on 
other metro access, and a decrease in metro ridership due to damage to the metro’s 
reputation, a decrease in personnel productivity and metro retail could also be 
considered as an intensifying factor. According to Washington D.C. Metro Budget 
report Fiscal year (2018), all other discussed elements increase CMetro ticket by 
multiplying - ≈ 1.56 which is not insignificant. A more comprehensive analysis 
requires gathering data or simulation of the dynamics of the system coupled with 
alternate transportation modes available to the passengers. 
 
Repair cost CRepair also is a function of recovery time,	"), and includes all the direct 
and indirect cost of reconstructing or restoring the property losses. Therefore, the 
recovery cost becomes: 
 





Metro repairs typically take considerable time and often recovery time does not occur 
equally over the time that metro components are disrupted. Thus, for cost analysis 
might require the use of the time value of money termed in terms of a discount rate. A 
discount rate determines how money at the present time has different value compared 
to the equivalent amount in future time. Deliberating this, any sum of money in 
present is worth more than the same amount in future represented by a coefficient. 
Hence, the CRecovery in this case is as follows: 
 





where i is the discount rate; the equation to express the relationship between present 
value (PV) and future value (FV) of the money is as follows: 
 
 P = 4(1	 + 	$)89 (6.9) 
 
where P is the present amount for a future payment, F, in N number of compounding 
periods, i.e., typically years. 
 
Analyzing the total cost in this dissertation also adopted the comparable mindset 
although not exact method of life cycle cost analysis (LCCA) as a supporting method. 
According to Federal Highway Administration (FHWA 2002), life cycle cost analysis 
is a method to quantify the total cost of alternatives options for investment or 





by selecting the lower total cost option. LCCA is a decision support method which is 
composed of the different following steps (TRB 2014): 
 
• Establishing different alternatives: In this step, several options are considered 
to fulfil the  objectives of the given projects and the economic difference 
between those options are associated with their total costs; 
• Determining each activity timing: Each activity duration for different 
alternatives of the project is estimated;  
• Estimating costs: The cost that demonstrates the difference between each 
alternative is projected; 
• Computing life cycle costs: In this step, the total cost associated with each 
alternative in its life cycle is assessed; and  
• Analyzing the results: Referring to the previous steps, the results are 
interpreted and the present value (PV) and inflation rate of each alternative are 
discussed and the cost efficient option is selected. 
 
The different steps of LCCA are illustrated in Fig. 6.8 . LCCA provides a mean to 







Figure 6.8. The different steps of Life cycle cost analysis LCCA. 
 
For the purpose of illustration and interpretation of the cost model outlined above, 
stations 38, 12 and 6 are assumed to be disrupted due to flooding resulting in several 
fatalities and many injuries in each station. Figure 6.9 shows a possible cost 
breakdown hierarchy for the disruptive event, measuring each item’s contribution to 









Figure 6.9. Illustrative cost breakdown hierarchy for a metro disruptive event in terms 
of their fractions with respect to the total cost based on the assumption of 9 fatalities 
and 100 Injuries in each station. 
 
In this example, several steps of LCCA are occurred almost the same and one of the 
step with justified difference as follows: 
 
• The different alternatives are available as there are three disrupted stations 





• The duration for recovering each alternative is estimated and the duration of 
each activity for different alternatives are easy to determine. The period of 
time to assess the cost differences is not the same for alternatives, however, it 
is assumed to be a factor of each other’s. Hence the results can be fairly 
compared; 
• The cost that demonstrates the difference between each alternative is 
determined; 
• Although sufficient data to assess the total cost of each alternative’s life-cycle 
in the cost model of this study is not available, the total cost associated with 
disruptive events could be computed. The total life cycle cost consists of 
initial cost, service cost, maintenance cost, operation cost and disposal cost. 
The total cost associated with a disruptive event, however, includes the repair 
cost, cost associated with life loss injuries and decrease in revenue due to 
income loss. Based on assumption made for each project, the total cost 
associated with a disruptive event could be comparable with the cost 
associated with service, maintenance and operation which are the significant 
portion of total life cycle cost of each alternative. In this dissertation, the 
project is metro network and the network components should be preserved for 
many long-term service life. Therefore, it is reasonable to substitute 
computing the total cost associated with a disruptive event with computing 
life cycle costs in the steps outlined for LCCA concluding LCCA supports the 





• The results could be feasibly analyzed and compared to select the cost 
efficient alternative. 
 
To analyze the total cost associated with disruptive event for each alternative (here 
each disrupted station), having realistic values for fatality and injury counts require 
making many other assumptions on the source and characteristic of the flooding 
event, time of the day, passenger population attributes, emergency response, other 
conditions beyond the stations, etc. Therefore, fatality and injury counts are 
indeterminate in realistic terms, and in order to illustrate the cost model, the values of 
9 fatalities and 100 injuries for each station are used as an demonstrative case of an 
extreme scenario. 
 
The U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation policy which includes rail 
roads, defines a Value of Statistical Life (VSL) of $9.6 million in 2016 US$ per 
fatality and compensation for injuries ranged from 3% to 60 % with a mean of 20% of 
VSL based on injuries severity (DOT 2016). Thus, this policy is used as a basis in 
quantifying the life losses and injuries in this paper and reflected in Fig. 6.8. The 
measurements of income losses are according to Washington D.C. Metro Budget 
report Fiscal year (2018), and the rough estimates of repair cost break down are based 
on communication with the operations manager of the FH Paschen company (2018), 
executing part of the Washington D.C. Metro construction. Considering variables 
such as the methods and equipment used in the project, as well as the construction 





Repair cost and duration are different for the aforementioned stations. In this 
particular example, we assume the repair duration for the station 38 is t1, for the 
station 12 is t2 and for the station 6 is t3. Based on further communication with the 
operations manager of the FH Paschen company (2019), the repair cost and duration 
of station 12 and 6 are roughly 0.7 and 0.4 of station 12, respectively. Income loss 
depends on the number of passengers in each station. For example, the ticket cost at 
L' Enfant Plaza station and using Eqs. (6.5) and (6.6) and factoring in the average 
ticket prices, ! = $3.25 (in 2018), the recovery cost is estimated to be 3.25(20394)t1 
= 0.66x105 t1. Taking -=1.56, then cost is equal to 0.103x106 t1. Additionally, the 
income loss contribution to the total cost according to Fig. 6.8 is 0.03, thus the total 
cost is 3.45x106 t1 and the recovery cost is calculated by deducting life losses and 
injury costs from the total cost. Thus, the recovery cost for the station 38 (L' Enfant 
Plaza station) is CRecovery= 0.28xCtotal= 0.96x106t1. Accordingly, the total cost for 
station 12 and 6 would be 3.79x106 t2 and 1.48x106 t3, respectively. Considering the 
relationship between t1, t2 and t3, the recovery and total costs for the three stations, 
referencing Fig. 6.8 cost details, are displayed in Table 6.9 and Fig. 6.10. 
 
Table 6.9 Recovery cost and total cost for stations L' Enfant plaza, Pentagon, Fort 
Totten 
Station Daily Passenger volume CRecovery Ctotal 
L' Enfant plaza (38) 20235 0.966*106 t1 3.45*106 t1 
Gallery Place (12) 22427 0.745*106 t1 2.65*106 t1 







Figure 6.10. Comparison of time-recovery cost for restoring three stations in 
Washington D. C. Metro. 
The example outlined above indicates identifying an appropriate recovery strategy 
depends not only on the recovery sequence and associated resilience, but also on the 
recovery cost. The recovery cost itself depends on recovery time t1 that is the 
dominant variables. Therefore, minimizing the recovery cost requires reducing the 
duration of recovery time, which basically is the repair duration. The repair cost in 
this paper is assumed to be different for the three stations considering their repair 
durations have linear relationship with their repair costs. However, looking further 
into the repair cost for each station with different sequences, construction methods, 
different work crews and materials, different direct and indirect cost would modify 
the relationship between repair cost and repair time. Previously stated consideration 
such as methods, equipment, work crew, accessibility and etc., could even change the 





monotonic and nonlinear function, which recognizing the optimum recovery time 
requires solving a time-cost trade off problem. Thus, a complete view regarding 
repair cost and duration of each station requires data and the use of optimization. 
Such pursuits may be undertaken in future works. 
 
6.3 Conclusions and Contributions 
A metro network is a critical components of interconnected infrastructure systems. 
Many attempts have been made to increase the ability of metro networks to adapt to 
the future changing environmental or occasional conditions leading to disruptive 
events; yet, development and enhancement through risk reduction are required to 
improve metro network resilience. To rise to this challenge, this chapter provides a 
methodology for examining comparative strategies prior to or post failure by a 
disruptive event through topology enhancement, or recovery sequence and cost 
identification, respectively. 
 
Chapter 6 uses the CNT method to illustrate the methodology and associated analytics 
for assessing the efficiency and vulnerabilities of the metro network. Accordingly, a 
topological network of nodes and links constitutes the basic framework of a metro 
network as a foundational step for risk and resilience analysis. 
 
An efficiency and vulnerability assessment identifies the most critical components of 






In this basis, this chapter provides strategies to improve the network resilience prior 
to failure given the topology enhancement through capital improvement. The chapter 
examines implanting three loop line alternatives in the network with each inserted 
based on subjective considerations, e.g., location criticality, passenger flow, 
locational connectedness, etc. Results show the network vulnerability could be 
reduced significantly by adding a loop line. In some components, inserting one loop 
line could reduce the vulnerability by 24.6%, i.e., an influence of loop line 1 on L' 
Enfant Plaza station. 
 
Efficiency assessment also provides the platform to develop the resilience metric that 
is the basis of the recovery analysis for the stages that follow a failure. For this 
purpose, this chapter provides steps to include the analysis of recovery and associated 
costs. The chapter comparatively ranks the recovery sequences based on resilience 
restoration and illustrates the cost model through an example to show that identifying 
the most appropriate recovery strategies based on only resilience restoration is 
insufficient. A recovery sequence that is cost effective is desirable. 
 
It should be pointed out that the metro network in chapter 5 assumed to be 
unweighted and undirected and all analyses are based on these assumptions. 
Although, this simplification method is practiced as an accepted and widely used 
method of assessment in network literatures, the better evaluation would be to 





length of each link, travel time, passenger flow, train volume and etc. — would be 
reflected as weight on the network components and form a weighted network. Such 
an assessment could be explored in future studies.  
 
 In addition, the comparative recovery analysis method presented in this chapter does 
not provide all the details necessary for practitioners, rather, it is intended to provide 
guidance to planners and decision-makers for selecting appropriate recovery 
sequence. Cost-time trade off analysis and optimizations are necessary for this 
purpose. Also, this chapter does not claim that adding a loop line is the most efficient 
way of enhancing the network resilience, yet preliminary results herein offer some 






Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
7.1. Conclusions and Findings 
This dissertation offers a methodology and presents a series of efforts to enhance the 
resilience of infrastructure networks.  
 
7.1.1 Enhancing the Network Topological Analysis 
 
Chapter 3 studies the network topological analysis. Derrible and Kennedy (2010), 
indicated that an efficient approach to characterize the safety and robustness of the 
network is through topological analysis. Studying the size and complexity of the 
network indeed are fundamental steps to analyzing its topology and basis to 
determine metrics associated with the resilience of networks and the resilience 
attributes. Thus, Chapter 3 serves to define the infrastructure system of choice, 
Washington D.C. Metro rail transit, as a network paradigm; identify the network form 
and the components that shape the network, and to provide a new probabilistic 
methods to investigate the topological characteristic of the network and enhance the 
topological analysis. The results show that Washington D.C. Metro is an L-shaped 
network, contains 91 stations (nodes) and 140 links, and demonstrates the presence of 






7.1.2 Investigating Different Failure cases in the Network and Their Impacts on the 
Network Resilience 
 
Failure analysis is the basis to assess the vulnerability of the network and to develop 
the resilience metric. Different failure cases may alter the network vulnerability and 
robustness not with the similar impact. For example, failing of different components 
of a network, i.e., node, link, may lead to a distinct response in the whole state of the 
network. Thus, as presented in Chapter 4 the failure analysis is implemented to 
explore the changes in the response that the network may have for each failure case. 
A set of analytical and computational work has been performed to evaluate the 
vulnerability of the Washington D.C. Metro using method of connectivity changes 
due to either node removal or link removal, one at a time for each case. The node 
removal identified the most critical stations are located in the downtown area. 
Furthermore, the link removal identified the most critical links, are positioned in the 
multi color-coded lines responsible for connecting east, west and south of 
Washington D.C. to the downtown area, as well as the Red and Green metro lines 
connecting the north-west quadrant of the city and the south-east quadrant of the city 
to the downtown area. Also, for both cases, the connectivity changes between the 
initial network connectivity (i.e., prior to any failures) and network connectivity 
measures after failure along with the resilience triangle concept are used to develop a 
metric of network resilience. 
 






Network resilience depends on both network topology and network dynamic. The 
network dynamic or the flow of the network is referencing the weights that the 
network components carry. The dominant weight in the metro network is the 
passenger flow. Since counting the number of passengers who travel on each link is a 
challenging task, a practical, mathematical model is proposed in Chapter 5 to 
anticipate link ridership based on the passenger volume of the stations. This method 
could be applied to estimate the weight strengths on the network links without 
changing the adjacency matrix and without posing higher computational burden.  
Any perturbation applied to the network could change the connectivity of the network 
topology as well as disrupt the network flow. Chapter 5 also proposes a novel 
algorithm to consider the network flow in the network global efficiency calculation 
and to reflect it on the resilience assessment. In order to calculate the global network 
efficiency along other resilience metrics, the topological connectivity for an 
unweighted network is analyzed in order to achieve a geodesic path between any two 
stations and also combined with the use of ridership data to construct a weighted 
network −in terms of the summation of link ridership weights on each geodesic 
path− to incorporate them into the global network efficiency equation. A modified 
network global efficiency is also derived to reflect the network flow. The algorithm 
proposed in Chapter 5 is precise, straightforward and sensible. It leads to affordable 
and quick computational work, and also addresses some shortcomings in other 
methods of weighted network analyses, such as inability to calculate the negative 






The algorithm is used to evaluate most components of the weighted Washington D.C. 
Metro by assessing the vulnerability of the network in the cases of node and link 
removals. Both cases demonstrate that the most critical components of the 
Washington D.C. Metro belong to the central part of the city as well as the northwest 
section of the Red Line. The results also demonstrate that some stations and links in 
the metrorail that carry a larger number of passengers compared to other stations and 
links ranked among the most vulnerable components of the metrorail. However, it is 
not a typical paradigm as extensively discussed in Chapter 5. The rankings according 
to criticality of stations and links is a combination result of the link position, station 
position, and the ridership of the network. Therefore, in the vulnerability assessment, 
location is as important as ridership and sometimes more influential.  
 
7.1.4 Offering strategy to enhance the network resilience prior to and following a 
failure  
 
Chapter 6 offered some strategies to increase the resilience of the network either by 
enhancing its topology prior to any failure, or by identifying proper post-failure 
recovery strategies, with special attention not only to restore the network resilience 
but also to minimize the total cost associated with a disruptive event resulting in 
resilience loss. Strategies for improving the network resilience prior to failure are 
provided given the topology enhancement through capital improvement. Different 
loop lines are inserted in the network based on subjective considerations, e.g., 
location criticality, passenger flow, locational connectedness, etc. Results show the 






Chapter 6 also includes the recovery analysis following a failure as an assertive 
strategy to increase the network resilience. It ranks the recovery sequences based on 
the resilience restoration and suggests the comprehensive cost model through an 
example to show that identifying the most appropriate recovery strategies based on 
only resilience restoration is insufficient. A recovery sequence that is cost effective is 
desirable. 
 
7.2 Novelty and Contributions 
 The novelty and major contribution of this dissertation lies on: 
 
• Providing the probabilistic method to investigate the presence of small-world 
characteristic in the network and advance the topological analysis;  
• Analyzing several failure cases, i.e., node and link failures in the network, to 
calculate the network resilience attributes; 
• Proposing a novel algorithm to model the general pattern of ridership in the 
metro network; 
• Proposing a new algorithm to reflect the network components weights on 
calculating the network efficiency;  
• Offering a strategy to enhance the network resilience prior to a failure by 
enhancing the network topology; 
• Offering a post-failure recovery strategy and a comprehensive cost model to 






7.3 Future Directions 
There are many future directions that researchers can take following the results of the 
work presented in this dissertation: 
 
1. This dissertation mainly focuses on passenger flow to form the weighted 
network. While, several factors from the tangible to abstract, such as — 
physical length of each link, slope of each link, travel time, train volume,  
reliability, energy, and, etc. — would be reflected as weight on the network 
components and form a weighted network. Such an assessment could be 
explored in future studies.  
2. The cost model in this dissertation provided comprehensive guidance to 
planners and decision makers for comparative recovery analysis study and 
selecting appropriate recovery sequence. However, the model does not 
provide all the details necessary for practitioners. To enhance the cost 
analysis, more economic data could be added and cost-time trade off analysis 
and optimizations will provide the enhanced economic assessments. 
3. One of the areas that impacts the infrastructure networks resilience, and has 
not yet been fully explored, is human interaction with infrastructure networks. 
Humans interact with infrastructure networks in such complex ways ranging 
from linear to nonlinear to obscure, which may positively or negatively affect 
a network’s resilience. Quantifying the human behavioral response to 





event in the network on human well-being would be the interesting area of the 
future work. 
4. This dissertation focuses on the engineering point of view to provide 
recommendations on the network modeling; while other dimensions - such as 
public policy, community demands, and other aspects - may impact the 
objective of the study and so modeling the network. For example, the 
objective of the investors of the metro network could lie more on saving 
money rather than delivering people to their destination more readily. Or, the 
metro might be needed by people in the poorest areas who lack other transport 
modes; however, those areas may be of less importance to those who fund 
metro. All of these objectives are also important and should be considered. 
The more items are seen, the better model is achieved. Thus, in large 
infrastructure systems, typically different experts collaborate with each other 
to make the optimum decisions. 
5. Infrastructure networks are interdependent; the state of one infrastructure may 
depend on the state of others. Any disruption in the components of one 
infrastructure could propagate risk in other infrastructures and trigger 
cascading failures across different infrastructure networks. Therefore, the 
recovery of a certain network from failure events, may be influenced by the 
recovery of other networks. Exploring the infrastructure interdependencies 
and providing the generic and quantitative framework for modeling the 
interdependency of other main infrastructure networks, i.e., communication 





other network analysis methods such as Bayesian network method, would be 







Appendix A: Numerical Example to Demonstrate the Model 
Proposed for Assessing Link Weights* 
 
To give a clear understanding of the logic and the method of the ridership calculation, 
a numerical example is provided to show how to calculate the ridership of one link 
based on the number of passengers at the two neighboring transfer stations connected 
by the link. Figure A-1. (a-c) demonstrates two, three and four nodes portion of metro 
network in abscissa. Each node has a specific number of passengers. The number of 
passengers in each node is indicated by Pi and ridership from node i to node j and 
node j to node i are specified by R i→j and R j→i , respectively. In this example i and j 
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Figure A-2. The different network examples of two, three and four nodes and their 
associated link ridership and node passengers (The arrows are referring to the 
passengers who travel from node i to j and j to i) 
 
First, assume two nodes are connected by a link such as Fig. A-1-(a), all passengers 
from node 1 (P1) leaves station 1 ⟹ R 1→2 =P1. It can also be presented as, R2→1 
=P1× =>=>. Also, all passengers from node 2 (P2) leaves station 2 ⟹ R2→1 =P2, or, R2→1 
=P2× =3=3.  
In Fig. A-1-(b), the number of nodes is increased and passengers in node 1, P1, do not 
have any choice other than transferring to node 3. Thus, R13=P1, and with the same 
logic, R2→3 =P2. However, for node 3 the situation is different. Passengers in node 3 
could move to either node 1 or node 2. Hence, R3→1+ R3→2 =P3. This is a single 
equation with two R j→i unknowns. However, a reasonable assumption can be made 
on the number of passengers that move to node 1 and the number of passengers that 
move to node 2 as being proportional to the count of passengers in node 1 and node 2, 
respectively. The portion or fraction of P3 to move to node 1 is 
=3
=3/=>
 of passengers in 





passengers in node 3 gives the portion of passengers moving from node 3 to node 1 
and from node 3 to node 2, respectively, as follows: R3→1 = (
=3
=3/=>
) ×	P3, R3→2 = 
( =>=3/=>) ×	P3. 
The process is repeated for 4 nodes according to Fig. A-1-(c) and the corresponding 




=( =>=3/=>/=?)	×	P3, and R3→4 =(
@
=3/=>/=?
)	×	P3. The results meet the condition of R3→1  
+ R3→2 + R3→4 =P3.   
The 4-node case can be illustrated using the following values: 
 
P1 P2 P3 P4 
2 4 27 12 
  















)	×	P3⟹ R34==( )++/@/)+)	×	27=18 
 





Appendix B: Average Daily Passenger Data 
Table B.1 Average daily passenger data in each station for Washington D.C. Metro 
Station 
number 




Station name Average daily 
passengers 
1 Glenmont 5671 19 Tenley town-AU 6587 
2 Wheaton 3864 20 Friendship Height 8503 
3 Forest Glen 2230 21 Bethesda 9883 
4 Silver spring 12269 22 Medical center 5591 
5 Takoma 5329 23 Grosvenor-
Strathmore 
5206 
6 Fort Totten 7543 24 White Flint 3641 
7 Brookland-cua 6324 25 Twin brook 4163 
8 Rhode Island 
Ave 
7727 26 Rockville 4245 
9 NoMa-Gallaudet 
U 
9038 27 Shady Grove 11732 
10 Union Station 29371 28 Greenbelt 5738 
11 Judiciary Sq 8722 29 College park UMD 4068 
12 Gallery Place 25537 30 Prince George's 
Plaza 
4385 
13 Metro Center 24330 31 West Hyattesville 3402 
14 Farragut North 24597 32 Georgia Ave-
petworth 
6151 
15 Dupont Circle 18653 33 Columbia Heights 11840 
16 Woodley Park 5861 34 UST 6671 
17 Cleveland Park 3961 35 Shaw-Howard 4989 





Table B-1, Continued 
Station 
number 




Station name Average daily 
passengers  
37 Archives 7829 55 Huntington 7002 
38 L'Enfant Plaza 19343 56 Van Dorn ST 2970 





6834 58 New-Carrollton 7209 
41 Anacostia 7799 59 Landover 1667 
42 Congress 
Heights 
2431 60 Cheverly 1153 
43 Southern Ave 4751 61 Deanwood 1347 
44 Naylor RD 2471 62 Minnesota Ave 2387 
45 Suitland 4918 63 Stadium-Armory 2430 
46 Branch Ave 5449 64 Potomac Ave 3635 
47 Arlington 
Cemetery 
363 65 Eastern Market 5500 
48 Pentagon  14584 66 Capitol South 6957 
49 Pentagon City 12558 67 Federal center SW 5697 
50 Crystal City 11480 68 Smithsonian 7149 
51 Ronald Reagan 
national airport 
5631 69 Federal Triangle 7381 
52 Braddock RD 
 
4543 70 Mc-Pherson Sq 
 
14340 
53 King-St old town 
 
7238 71 Farragut West 
 
20917 










Table B-1, Continued 
Station 
number 




Station name Average 
daily 
passengers  
73 Rosslyn 13666 83 Morgan BLVD 1849 
74 courthouse 7074 84 Addison RD 2971 
75 clarendon 4423 85 Capitol Heights 1893 
76 Virginia Sq-GMU 3898 86 Benning RD 2823 
77 Ballston-MU 10759 87 Mclean 1562 
78 East falls church 3913 88 Tyson corner 2857 
79 West Falls 
Church 
2715 89 Greensboro 1079 
80 West Falls 
Church 
4981 90 Spring Hill 1042 
81 Vienna 10005 91 Wiehle-Reston 
East 
7306 
82 Largo Town 
center 
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